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BOUNDARY CHANGES AND THE NEXUS BETWEEN
FORMAL AND INFORMAL SOCIAL CONTROL:







Debate over the purpose of punishment and other state
interventions in response to crime is a modern continuation of
an ancient discourse. Begun in the Western world largely as
result of Cesare Beccaria's challenge to the barbaric practices
and the excessively brutal retribution that governed the exercise
of punishment in the nation states of previous eras,1 the moral
philosophy of deterrence continued as a rational basis for justice
through the 18th century.2 Yet this philosophy has not survived
without controversy. Indeed, some have argued that it is through
retribution that deterrence can be achieved,' while others have
observed that "deterrence theory is used widely as a cloak for ven-
geance."4 Moreover, in contemporary society, some might "feel
morally uncomfortable with demanding revenge," whereas deter-
ring criminal behavior represents "a more socially acceptable
goal."5 Indeed, the utilitarian critique of more emotive and
* Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Florida Atlantic
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1. See CESARE BECCARIA, OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRIT-
INGS (Richard Bellamy ed., Richard Davies trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995)
(1764).
2. E.g., Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation (Hafner Publ'g Co. 1970) (1789).
3. E.g., HORACE L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1968).
4. KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 206 (1968).
5. JEANNE B. STINCHCOMB & VERNON B. Fox, INTRODUCTION TO CORREC-
TIONS 49 (5th ed. 1999).
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expressive rationales for punishment continues today among ret-
ribution and deterrence advocates. 6
While deterrence reigned for several centuries as the pri-
mary theory and operational strategy for achieving the utilitarian
ends of crime control and prevention, rehabilitation emerged in
the twentieth century as a contender for intervention domi-
nance. Traditional thinking about the nature and causes of
crime was challenged at this point by social forces ranging from
economic conditions to theoretical advancements. Just as the
economic collapse of the Great Depression created doubts about
long-held explanations of crime as "sins" or personal weak-
nesses,7 the advent of psychological theory and the emergence of
social work as a profession offered optimistic hope that offenders
could be changed and their lives redirected through alternative
measures. As a result, proponents of rehabilitative theories
argued for revised rationales for intervention dictating more
benevolent, treatment-oriented responses to criminal behavior.
But as crime continued to increase and public policy agen-
das became more conservative during the late twentieth century,
the tide turned yet again. By this point, many held out little
hope for either changing offenders or improving conditions that
cause crime, and instead argued for a kind of temporary contain-
ment of the problem. Advocates of such a pragmatic "manage-
rial" approach to criminal justice promoted constraint-oriented
incapacitation in an effort to isolate the offender socially and
physically from law-abiding society.' Finally, as the century came
to a close, proponents of less formal, nonadversarial justice
approaches gained new audiences, and advocates of restorative
justice9 argued also for a distinctive normative theory of interven-
tion that sought as its primary objective the repair of harm to
victims, communities, and offenders caused by crime.
It was not until the second half of the twentieth century that
criminal justice debate began to address a second related con-
cern, the role of the state and criminal justice systems in adminis-
tering punishment and intervention. By the late sixties, the due
6. See Lawrence W. Sherman, Reason for Emotion: Reinventing Justice with
Theories, Innovations, and Research-The American Society of Criminology Address, 41
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 (2003).
7. STINCHCOMB & Fox, supra note 5, at 112-13.
8. E.g., Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on
the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 458
(1992).
9. E.g., HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A NEW Focus FOR CRIME AND
JUSTICE (1990);JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGU-
LATION (2002) [hereinafter BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION].
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process revolution that sought to expand defendants' constitu-
tional protections had proposed, for example, new limits on the
search and seizure powers of the state. More broadly, a new lib-
ertarian movement in criminal justice featured a critique of the
effectiveness of intervention, arguing in many cases that even the
most well-intended efforts of the justice systems (e.g., juvenile
diversion programs) were often counterproductive in their
impact. Policies such as diversion, deinstitutionalization, and
decriminalization essentially sought to place limits on state inter-
vention, not only to ensure that due process rights were pro-
tected, but also to prevent the potential additional harm of
stigmatization and future vulnerability to more severe criminal
justice sanctions.' 0
In the decade of the 1990s, concerns expressed by advocates
of many of these "limiting" policies seemed to have been placed
on the back burner as a crime control agenda gained promi-
nence." Ultimately, debate over the role of criminal justice
agencies became focused on the issue of what appears to be a
growing erosion or blurring.'2 One of the most frequently dis-
cussed boundary changes in the 1990s has been the assumption
by criminal courts and adult corrections of jurisdiction over
offenses and offenders once adjudicated in juvenile courts and
managed in juvenile justice systems.13 Widely criticized by youth
advocates and many criminologists, the erosion of the jurisdic-
tion of juvenile courts over more serious offenders has occurred
as a result of a variety of mechanisms that facilitate the transfer of
young offenders into criminal courts. Moreover, importing crim-
inal justice policies and procedures such as mandatory, determi-
nate sentencing into juvenile courts, along with a more powerful
role for prosecutors, has also challenged and circumscribed the
dispositional decisionmaking authority of juvenile court judges.
While the loss of juvenile court jurisdiction over many seri-
ous and chronic young offenders has been widely discussed,
10. See, e.g., Edwin Lemert, Diversion in Juvenile Justice: What Has Been
Wrought?, 18J. REs. CRIME & DELINQ. 34, 40 (1981); LAMAR T. EMPEY, AMERICAN
DELINQUENCY- ITS MEANING AND CONSTRUCTION (1982).
11. E.g., DIANNA GORDON, THEJUSTICEJUGGERNAUT 47 (1991).
12. Charles M. Friel, A Century of Changing Boundaries, in 2 BOUNDARY
CHANGES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE ORGANIZATIONS 1 (Nat'l Inst. ofiustice ed., 2000),
available at http://www.ncjrs.org/criminal-justice2000/vol_
2 /0 2 b 2 .pdf (on file
with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
13. See e.g., PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIO-
LENTJUrENILE CRIME 25 (1996); Donna Bishop, et al., The Transfer ofJuveniles to
Criminal Court: Does It Make A Difference, 42 CRIME AND DELINQ. 171, 174 (1996);
Jeffrey Butts & Daniel Mears, Reviving Juvenile Justice in a Get-Tough Era, 33
YOUTH & SOC'Y 169, 184 (2001).
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there is another, more obscure side to the boundary erosion
issue. Notably, despite widespread criticism of the courts in the
1990s, juvenile justice programs again appear to be intervening
actively in response to runaways, incorrigibles, curfew violators,
youth experimenting with alcohol and smoking, truants, and
other status offenders.14 In previous decades, such cases had
generally been viewed as off-limits to court intervention.' 5 Ironi-
cally, on the heels of a period of national concern about violent
youth crime, juvenile justice agencies and programs (often with
the support of lawmakers and new criminal justice system part-
nerships) have begun "reaching down" to reclaim jurisdiction
over non-criminal forms of deviance, troublemaking, and con-
flict involving young people that was once dealt with informally
by families, neighbors, schools, various youth development agen-
cies, and other non-judicial entities. 6
This "reaching down" phenomenon is not, however, solely
about the blurring of lines between the jurisdictions of various
justice agencies or the redefinition of professional roles dis-
cussed in the emerging literature on boundary change and com-
munity justice. 1 Rather, boundaries being crossed or eroded are
those between formal and informal social control, as legal trends
and criminal justice resources appear to expand to fill a per-
ceived void in the capacity of communities to exercise informal
control.' 8 More specifically, juvenile justice and other formal
agencies of social control appear to be engaging public controls
in place of the informal private controls characteristic of families
14. Barry C. Feld, Rehabilitation, Retribution and Restorative Justice: Alterna-
tive Conceptions ofJuvenile Justice, in RESTORATIVEJUVENILEJUSTICE: REPAIRING THE
HARM OF YOUTH CRIME 17, 23 (Gordon Bazemore & Lode Walgrave eds., 1999)
[hereinafter Feld, Alternative Conceptions]; Barry Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the
Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 471, 480 (1987).
15. E.g., JOHN T. WHITEHEAD & STEPHEN P. LAB, JUVENILE JUSTICE: AN
INTRODUCTION 47 (2004).
16. E.g., Vincent Shiraldi & Mark Soler, The Will of the People? The Public's
Opinion of the Violent and Repeat Juvenile Offender Act of 1997, 44 CRIME & DELINQ.
590, 590-91 (1998); Gordon Bazemore, The Fork in the Road to Juvenile Court
Reform, 564 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 81, 99 (1999) [hereinafter
Bazemore, The Fork in the Road].
17. See, e.g., Mark Moore, Looking Backward to Look Forward: The 1967 Crime
Commission Report in Retrospect, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OFJUSTICE JOURNAL (Nat'l
Inst. ofJustice, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 1997, at 24; Friel, supra
note 12; Katherine Coles & George L. Kelling, New Trends in Prosecutors'
Approaches to Youthful Offenders: Community Prosecution, Problem Solving, and
Preventing Crime, in SECURING OUR CHILDREN'S FUTURE: NEW APPROACHES TO
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND YOUTH VIOLENCE 28 (Gary Katzman ed., 2002).
18. DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAw 68 (1976).
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and extended families, as well as the parochial controls reflective
of neighbors, community groups, faith communities, recrea-
tional programs, and educational organizations.' 9
One increasingly important context for this extension of for-
mal criminal and juvenile justice control has been in the nation's
secondary schools.2 ° As a formal socializing institution with a
public mandate to maintain sufficient order to provide an orga-
nizational climate conducive to the education of students, the
school has traditionally exercised a quasi-formal type of social
control over young people. When viewed as a kind of "micro-
community," however, it is apparent that schools also rely heavily
on informal, private controls that flow out of the affective or rela-
tionaP1 influence of individual teachers, coaches, other educa-
tional staff, and students, as well as what amounts to parochial
control exercised by school organizations and conventional peer
groups. "Zero-tolerance" logic and rhetoric2" have in the past
decade increasingly supplemented this informal influence, as
well as the official authority and decisionmaking discretion of
educational professionals. As this has occurred, some would sug-
gest that the informal and quasi-formal controls of the school
have been weakened, if not displaced, by an expansion of the
formal controls of police and juvenile justice.23 One apparent
result has been an increase in the number of students now being
referred to the nation's juvenile courts for various forms of
19. AlbertJ. Hunter, Private, Parochial and Public Social Orders: The Problem
of Crime and Incivility in Urban Communities, in THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL Con-
trol: Citizenship and Institution Building in Modern Society (Gerald D. Suttles
& Meyer N. Zald eds., 1985) [hereinafter THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL CONTROL].
20. E.g., Trulson et al., Social Control in a School Setting: Evaluating a School-
Based Boot Camp, 47 CRIME & DELINQ. 573, 573-74 (2001); RICHARD LAWRENCE,
SCHOOL CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE (1998).
21. E.g.,JOHN HAGAN, STRUCTURAL CRIMINOLOGY 44 (1989).
22. E.g., Trulson et al., supra note 20, at 577; NANCY RIESTENBERG, MINN.
DEP'T OF CHILDREN, FAMILIES, & LEARNING, IN-SCHOOL BEHAVIOR INTERVENTION
GRANTS FINAL REPORT 1999-2001 (2001) [hereinafter RIESTENBERG, IN-SCHOOL
BEHAVIOR]; MINN. DEP'T OF CHILDREN, FAMILIES, & LEARNING, RESPECTING EVERY-
ONE'S ABILITY TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS: RESTORATIVE MEASURES (1998).
23. E.g., WILLIAM G. STAPLES, THE CULTURE OF SURVEILLANCE: DISCIPLINE
AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES 52 (1997); TODD CLEAR & DAVID
KARP, THE COMMUNITYJUSTICE IDEAL: PREVENTING CRIME AND ACHIEVINGJUSTICE
24 (1999). It is of course true that juvenile courts have always helped to rein-
force the informal controls of the school through formal controls of the court
developed in truancy enforcement. See ANTHONY PAtr, THE CHILD SAVERS:
THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (1976). 'What has changed, as we will illustrate
in the text that follows, is a broader criminal justice role and an increasing
transfer of responsibility.
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school conduct violations and other conflicts once addressed
within the school environment.
24
After more than two decades of expanding the criminal jus-
tice presence in schools in response to a variety of behavioral and
public safety concerns, the issue of truancy has recently risen to a
position of high priority on the agenda of some criminal justice
agencies. 5 This Article examines truancy intervention as a gen-
eral case study in the blurring of boundaries between formal and
informal social control when juvenile and criminal justice
resources are mobilized to address a problem once seen prima-
rily as a school, family, or community concern. To do so, we
describe a large law enforcement-led truancy intervention collab-
orative in an urban county in the southeastern United States
(hereinafter, Southeastern County). As a specific case study in
early implementation of an increasingly popular centralized
intake approach to truancy intervention, the Southeastern
County initiative raises important policy and theoretical concerns
that emerge from what we refer to as a new "expansionist" ten-
dency in juvenile justice.26
Ultimately, we attempt to place the Southeastern County tru-
ancy intervention case study in the broader context of expansion
ofjuvenile justice boundaries in response to a variety of problems
related to control and socialization of young people. As an alter-
native to both expansionist and libertarian policies, we also
briefly consider emerging frameworks from the restorative justice
literature and practice27 that seek to build community capacity to
mobilize social support and informal social control in response
24. See, e.g., Myriam L. Baker et al., Truancy Reduction: Keeping Students in
School,UJV. JUST. BULL. (U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Office ofJuvenile Justice & Delin-
quency Prevention, Wash. D.C.), Sept. 2001, at 1, 2, available at http://
www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/ojjdp/188947.pdf (on file with the Notre Dame Jour-
nal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
25. See Sara Ingersoll & Donna LeBoeuf, Reaching Out to Youth Out of the
Education Mainstream, JUV. JUST. BULL. (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of juvenile
Justice & Delinquency Prevention, Wash. D.C.), Feb. 1997, available at http://
www.zuni.k12.nm.us/Ias/PDF/163928.pdf (on file with the Notre Dame Jour-
nal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy); LAWRENCE, supra note 20; see also Baker et
al., supra note 24.
26. Gordon Bazemore & Colleen McLeod, Restorative Justice and the Future
of Diversion and Informal Social Control, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: THEORETICAL
FOUNDATIONS 143 (Elmar G.M. Weitekamp & Hans-Jurgen Kerner eds., 2002).
27. Urban Policies and Programs To Reduce Truancy, DIGEST (ERIC Clearing-
house on Urban Educ., New York, N.Y.), Nov. 1997; DANIEL VAN NESS & KAREN
HEETDERKS STRONG, RESTORING JUSTICE (1997); BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGU-
LATION, supra note 9.
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to crime. 28 As such, these frameworks also have legal, ethical,
and policy implications for the broader theme of the purpose of
punishment and criminal justice intervention, as well as for the
role of criminal justice agencies in such intervention.
I. LTERATRE REVIEW
In the literature review that follows, we first outline the com-
ponents of the expansionist tendency in juvenile justice over the
past decade. We then consider the literature on criminal justice
involvement in schools in the context of the relationship
between informal and formal social control, in general, and tru-
ancy intervention and related research in particular.
A. The Context: Formal and Informal Control and the
New Expansionism
The situation is truly ironic. The argument for retaining
beyond-control and truancy jurisdiction is that juvenile
courts have to act in such cases because "if we don't act, no
one else will." I submit that precisely the opposite is the
case: because you act, no one else does. Schools and pub-
lic agencies refer their problem cases to you because you
have jurisdiction, because you exercise it, and because you
hold out promises that you can provide solutions.
29
1. The Relationship Between Formal and Informal Social
Control
As noted in the judge's words of frustration above, the issue
of shifting boundaries between formal and informal systems of
social control is not new. As suggested more than two decades
ago, when there is a breakdown in informal community controls,
an increase in formal, legal, or justice-related controls generally
follows.8 ° More recently, criminologists have argued that various
types of informal control may serve to mediate the negative
28. See generally Francis T. Cullen, Social Support as an Organizing Concept for
Criminology, Presidential Address to the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, 11 JUsT.
Q. 527 (1994); John Braithwaite, Thinking Harder About Democratizing Social Con-
trol, in FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCING IN JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE WAY FORWARD OR
MISPLACED OPTIMISM? 199 (Christine Adler &Joy Wundersitz eds., 1994) [here-
inafter Braithwaite, Thinking Harder]; Gordon Bazemore, Young People, Trouble,
and Crime: Restorative Justice as a Normative Theory of Informal Social Control and
Social Support, 33 YOUTH & SOCIETY 199 (2001) [hereinafter Bazemore, Young
People].
29. David Bazelon, Jurisdiction over Status Offenses Should be Removed from the
Juvenile Court, 21 CIME & DELINQ. 98 (1975).
30. See BLACK, supra note 18, at 68.
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impact of neighborhood, demographic, and ecological factors
on youth crime and have demonstrated empirically that break-
downs in informal control mechanisms in communities lead to
higher youth crime rates." While some would argue that expan-
sion of formal criminal justice control in targeted neighborhoods
is simply a response to these breakdowns, others have suggested
that formal controls exercised by the criminal justice system may
do more than simply fill gaps in informal social control. Rose
and Clear, for example, argue that criminal justice intervention
is far from neutral in its impact on individuals and community
life-especially when it results in the breakup of families and
neighborhood institutions as a result of the removal of a critical
mass of young men through incarceration.32 Such impacts yield
a kind of "negative social capital" that is, in turn, associated with
subsequent increases in crime.33
Indeed, communities characterized by a high level of crimi-
nal justice intervention may grow weaker and eventually lose
their capacity both to mobilize the type of informal social control
traditionally provided by families, neighborhood groups, and
social institutions,34 and to offer informal social support for
offenders, crime victims, and their families. In the past two to
three decades, for example, families, neighbors, schools, and
other community institutions have looked increasingly to juve-
nile courts and juvenile justice programs to fill perceived gaps in
the control of youth crime and troublesome behavior by young
people. 36 The resulting expansionist trend in juvenile justice sys-
tems now provides new impetus for formal intervention, supple-
menting and potentially displacing informal controls by
31. See ROBERT J. BURSIK, JR. & HAROLD G. GRASMICK, NEIGHBORHOODS
AND CRIME: THE Dimensions of Effective Community Control (1993); Robert
Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Effi-
cacy, 277 Sci. MAG. 918 (1997).
32. Dina Rose & Todd Clear, Incarceration, Social Capital and Crime: Impli-
cations for Social Disorganization Theory, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 411, 471-79 (1998).
33. See, e.g., Nils Christie, Conflict as Property, 17 BRIT. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 1
(1997) (questioning the neutrality of the impact of formal social control on
informal processes of crime control and conflict resolution). Christie argues
that the criminal justice system has essentially been engaged in a "theft of con-
flict" from victims and offenders and a consolidation of power and expertise
that over time has resulted in a "deskilling" of citizens in the competencies
needed for crime control. Id. See also Todd Clear et al., Incarceration and the
Community: The Problem of Removing and Returning Offenders, 47 CRIME & DELINQ.
335 (2001) (recommending services that will alleviate the negative effects that
incarceration has on the social dynamics of a neighborhood).
34. Hunter, supra note 19, at 239.
35. CLEAR & KARP, supra note 23, at 42-44.
36. Bazemore, The Fork in the Road, supra note 16, at 100.
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increasing the number of front-end intervention programs and
resources.
2. Rejecting Front-End Limits on Juvenile Court Jurisdiction:
The End of Juvenile Justice Deconstruction
The second half of the 1990s witnessed what in many juris-
dictions appeared to be an abandonment of the two-decade-long
trend toward "limiting" policies initiated in the 1970s
3 7 and, for
the most part, actively endorsed well into the 1980s. Diversion,
deinstitutionalization, due process, and decriminalization
reforms of the post-Gaul 8 era ofjuvenile justice were based on a
comprehensive critique of the juvenile justice system and sought
to place restrictions on what was widely viewed as harmful formal
intervention.39  This multi-modal, deconstructionist policy
approach, among other things, sought to remove status offenders
from the jurisdiction of the court and from vulnerability to the
negative impact of detention and residential facilities.
4 °
In an apparent response to new "get tough" legislative initia-
tives that removed court jurisdiction over more serious crimes
and mandated transfer of increasing numbers of young people to
adult court,41 state legislatures and numerous local governments
began in the 1990s to relax boundaries that, in many institutions,
had kept most runaways, truants, curfew violators, underage
drinkers, and teen smokers out of the system. Even where this
undoing of past restrictions on intervention did not occur for-
mally, courts and juvenile justice systems seemed to find new
vehicles and new rationales for taking back jurisdiction over
youth who had not violated criminal statutes, but were nonethe-
less troublesome.
While not consistently documented, a number of examples,
both nationally and within states, illustrate what could be viewed
as an effort of juvenile courts to adapt to lost discretion at the
"hard" end of the system by finding new targets of opportunity at
37. See generally Lemert, supra note 10; TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE DEtUN-
QUENCY, THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, TASK
FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME (1967).
38. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
39. See EMPEY, supra note 10, at 440-78.
40. Despite changes in juvenile justice codes in Western countries which
place more emphasis on increased intervention and offender accountability,
many, including Canada, the UK, Germany, and Belgium also include strict
lower limits on intervention that maximize the use of informal options such as
police cautioning.
41. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld,Juvenile (In)Justice and the Criminal Court Alterna-
tive, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 403 (1993); Butts & Mears, supra note 13.
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the "soft" end.4 2 First, in general, the juvenile court has shown
greater interest in the past decade in status offenders.43 In 1997,
for example, juvenile courts handled 158,500 petitioned status
offense cases, an increase of more than ninety percent over the
number processed in 1988. 4 4 In addition, 11,600 adjudicated sta-
tus offenders were confined in out-of-home placements in
1997,4" and some 6,000 youth were in custody for a status offense
on any given day in 1997.46 Second, there is also evidence that
courts in some larger states (e.g., Pennsylvania) are processing
more low-level criminal offense cases and issuing supervision and
placement orders for first offenders and misdemeanants that in
the past generally would have been diverted from the system.4 7
Third, specific initiatives have expanded control and jurisdiction
over young people. For example, the expansion of curfew laws
and programs that enforce these statutes is now well docu-
mented.4 8 In addition, 41,000 truancy cases were processed in
juvenile courts in 1998, an eighty-five percent increase over the
number processed in 1989. 4" Finally, courts and other local juve-
nile justice agencies have utilized multiple mechanisms for
enforcing failure of young people to comply with the prohibi-
tions-including processing and temporary confinement in cen-
tralized intake assessment centers, new referral to sanctioning
programs, citations, and revocation of drivers' licenses. In addi-
tion, an increase in use of secure pre-adjudicatory detention for
status offenders from 8,500 to 9,400 between 1990 and 19975"
also seems likely to be related to these new enforcement
emphases.
Arguably, one practical rationale for this front-end expan-
sion of the juvenile justice system was a new sense of desperation,
42. See generally IRA M. SCHWARTZ, (IN) JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: RETHINKING
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1989); Feld, Alternative Conceptions, supra
note 14, at 23; Bazemore & McLeod, supra note 26, at 152, 165.
43. See, e.g., WHITEHEAD & LAB, supra note 15.
44. Charles Puzzanchero et al., Juvenile Court Statistics 1997, at 37
(National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2000).
45. Id. at 39.
46. Melissa Sickmund, Offenders in Juvenile Court, 1995, Juv. JusT. BULL.,
Dec. 1997, at 8-9.
47. JamieJ. Fader et al., Factors Involved in Decisions on Commitment to Delin-
quency Programs for First-Time Juvenile Offenders, 18JusT. Q. 323 (2001).
48. See MIKE A. MALES, THE SCAPEGOAT GENERATION: AMERICA'S WAR ON
ADOLESCENTS (1996); WHITEHEAD & LAB, supra note 15; see also K Michael Reyn-
olds et al., Do Juvenile Curfew Laws Work? A Time-Series Analysis of the New Orleans
Law, 17JusT. Q. 205 (2000).
49. Baker et al., supra note 24, at 2.
50. WHITEHEAD & LAB, supra note 15; see also Puzzanchero et al., supra
note 44, at 39.
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at times bordering on hysteria,51 about perceived increases in
youth involvement in a variety of deviant behaviors. While policy-
makers may or may not have reflected genuine public concern in
supporting the new front-end focus on drinking, drug use, tru-
ancy, premarital sex, and running away, it is the implied relation-
ship between these behaviors and the increase in serious youth
crime that seems most problematic. Support for this connection,
as well as funding that surprisingly seemed to breathe new life
into juvenile justice systems under political scrutiny, was provided
at the federal level as part of a widely discussed national policy
focus on serious offenders.
Ironically, in the wake of what by the mid-1990s had become
the most severe attack on the juvenile court in its history,
52 fund-
ing ostensibly aimed at combating youth violence instead sup-
ported a range of front-end programs and initiatives focused on
youth who had not committed crimes or who were less serious
offenders. The most obvious example of proposed federal legis-
lation to support expanded use of criminal and juvenile justice
penalties-including jail and detention, as well as other sanc-
tions, such as expulsion from school-in response to low level
youth conflict and troublesome behaviors, including smoking,
was Senate Bill S. 10. 3 Ironically tided "The Violent and Repeat
Juvenile Offender Act of 1997," S. 10 seemed to be a response to
the desire of law enforcement and some juvenile justice profes-
sional constituencies to gain national approval and resources for
practices they wished to initiate, or had continued to employ
despite prohibitions (e.g., jailing or detaining status offenders).
Though out of touch with public opinion according to a national
survey,'54 and ultimately defeated, the legacy of S. 10 can be seen
in the national legitimacy and policy incentives it provided for
encouraging practices that had been actively discouraged by fed-
eral policy in the past two decades55 (e.g., detention of status
offenders). This legacy can also be seen in less draconian legisla-
tion including the congressional appropriation in 1998 of "pass-
through" funds under the Juvenile Accountability Incentive
51. MALES, supra note 48.
52. SeeToRBET ET AI.., supra note 13; Penelope Lemov, The Assault onjuve-
nile Justice, GO\ERNING MAc., Dec. 1994, at 26; Butts & Mears, supra note 13, at
173.
53. Violent and RepeatJuvenile Offender Act of 1997, S. 10, 105th Cong.
(1997).
54. Shiraldi & Soler, supra note 16, at 590-601.
55. See Brief of Amici Curiae Children, Youth and Families Department,
In reAndrew A. (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (No. 22,891) (on file with author) (chal-
lenging detention of youth who fail to complete "grade court" requirements).
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Block Grant (JAIBG) 56 to encourage states to expand juvenile
justice capacity to address the apparent national increase injuve-
nile violent crime.
While many of the states receiving JAIBG funds appear to
have used portions of these allocations to expand detention and
residential bed capacity consistent with what most observers
judged to be congressional intent to target violent crime, others
also developed new front-end "preventive" programs that, in
many instances, seemed designed specifically to increase court
capacity to respond to troublesome youth behaviors not believed
to be adequately addressed by current youth services and educa-
tional programs. Some of these funds also allowed for experi-
mentation with new and innovative practices including
restorative and community justice programming, and some sup-
porters of the new federal legislation no doubt sought to
strengthen juvenile justice systems in order to recapture some of
the court's jurisdiction over serious youth crime. However, there
is no evidence to suggest that these new resources have reduced
the number of juvenile offenders whose cases were processed in
criminal courts.57
B. Three Components of the New Expansionism
Three independent, yet mutually reinforcing, core compo-
nents of expansionism provide the ideological basis and practical
resources for the juvenile justice system's effort to strengthen its
credibility and mandate by widening its jurisdiction over youthful
behaviors that had previously been off-limits or low priority for
intervention.
1. Zero Tolerance
Perhaps the most fundamental ideological rationale behind
the new expansionist tendency is the group of policies generally
labeled "zero tolerance." As a new mantra with apparently unas-
sailable logical and moral authority, zero tolerance seemed sud-
56. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
57. We are not suggesting that a state's use of funds for front-end pro-
grams rather than for residential beds was an unwise choice, and indeed, some
states appear to have used funds for needed training and technical assistance
focused on long-overdue system reform agendas. We simply argue that the
JAIBG initiative provided a readily available source of revenue for those jurisdic-
tions feeling pressured to pilot programs intended primarily to address behav-
iors such as truancy, smoking, and curfew violations. For evidence that juvenile
justice expansion has not slowed the rate of transfer to adult courts, see Butts &
Mears, supra note 13, at 178.
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denly in the middle of the past decade to justify due process
violations, new and old forms of confinement, forced treatment,
punishment, and outright exclusion of young people who cause
trouble for authorities in a variety of educational, recreational,
social service, and even juvenile justice residential program con-
texts. 58 Moreover, parallels between zero tolerance in schools
and the zero-tolerance policing associated with the focus on
order-maintenance,"9 though formally disconnected, may
become increasingly relevant with the expansion of the law
enforcement role in the schools-especially in response to
truancy.
60
Because youth in the 2000s can enter the juvenile justice sys-
tem through more doors than in recent decades, many problem-
solving and conflict resolution practices that would traditionally
have been employed in various informal contexts (e.g., class-
rooms) now seem to be bypassed, making way for expanded use
of other "fast-track" paths into the juvenile justice system. Under
the logic of zero tolerance, a crime control perspective now
increasingly holds sway in the broader school context; thus, a
variety of forms of rule-breaking have become justifications for
the exclusion of troublesome young people. As this has
occurred, juvenile justice agencies under siege appear to have
regained credibility in part by accepting a new role in enforcing
zero tolerance in the schools, and in doing so, reinforcing the
work of the now familiar efforts of school law enforcement
officers with a new cadre of school probation officers. 6 Such
indirect juvenile justice support for zero tolerance, as well as the
successful resistance to the call for abolition of juvenile justice
systems, has not been garnered by traditional juvenile court pro-
fessionals and their advocates acting alone. Rather, it has no
doubt been due to the influence of partners in new alliances
between the court and its programs with law enforcement, prose-
58. Zero tolerance is not a philosophy limited to schools, but has for
some time been a guiding principle of operation in secure residential facilities
in juvenile justice programs that make use of increasingly strict behavioral rules
that ironically permit ejection of young people from these programs for some
of the very behaviors they are attempting to correct. Public spaces under more
strict regulations such as malls, downtown civic centers, and other locations may
become a setting for a contest between young people and those business owners
and civic leaders who also promote zero tolerance regulation in such contexts.
See, e.g., ROB WHITE, PUBLIC SPACES FOR YOUNG PEOPLE: A GUIDE TO CREATIVE
PROJECTS AND STRATEGIES (1998).
59. BERNARD HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BRO-
KEN WINDOWS POLICING 43-45 (2001).
60. E.g., Trulson et al., supra note 20, at 576-77.
61. Id.
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cutors, and other criminal justice agencies not traditionally
viewed as partners with the juvenile court.
2. New System Collaborations and Boundary Erosion
Reinforcing zero tolerance as a response to troublesome
young people has been the emergence of new, stronger collabo-
rations between what have traditionally been "loosely coupled"
components of criminal justice systems with frequently incompat-
ible agendas.62 In the mid-1900s, weakened juvenile justice orga-
nizations, such as probation and local treatment agencies, as well
as the court itself, began to align themselves with more politically
powerful components of the system-i.e., local law enforcement
and prosecutors. Such alliances have often been built around
collaborations to implement new initiatives focused on gang pre-
vention and intervention programs, centralized intake/assess-
ment centers, curfew enforcement centers, and a range of early
intervention and prevention projects often associated with new
sources of funding.
63
The surprisingly seamless coordination between law enforce-
ment and social services in the implementation of such new
forms of front-end intervention seems to signal the beginning of
another type of professional boundary erosion. Specifically, as
will be illustrated in the case study presented in this Article, pros-
ecution/enforcement sectors began to assume more responsibil-
ity and leadership for what were once essentially social services
and public health functions, while traditional juvenile justice
agencies, in turn, were asked to focus more attention on surveil-
lance, enforcement and sanctioning tasks. Through pursuit of
the common goal of more effectively identifying and processing
"youth-at-risk," the new collaborative in support of expansionist
polices seemed to combine elements of "soft side" counseling,
remedial education, and substance abuse treatment with more
aggressive and coercive law enforcement and expanded prosecu-
tion and suppression (i.e., gang units). While multi-dimensional
intervention offerings have apparently done much to insulate
such collaboratives from vulnerability to criticism by youth advo-
cates or civil libertarians, the end result may be goal confusion or
a merger of priorities to achieve the least common denominator.
Such a merger may also give precedence to what has been called
62. John Hagan, Why Is There So Little Criminal Justice Theory?, 26 J. REs.
CRIME & DELINQ. 116, 118 (1989).
63. See generally Shay Bilchik, Community Assessment Centers: A Discussion of
the Concept's Efficacy, Monograph, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, U.S. Department of Juvenile Justice. Washington, D.C. (1995);
Reynolds, supra note 48.
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a "managerial" criminal justice approach6 4 in which leadership
seeks to achieve the most politically acceptable solution that may
have little to do with traditional criminal justice goal attainment
(e.g., reducing recidivism).
3. New Faith in the Court and Quasi-Formal Processing:
Specialized Juvenile Justice Courts and Programs
In what appears to be a reversal of the aforementioned decon-
structionist reforms that sought to minimize court intervention
and avoid the tendency to overload youth in trouble with surveil-
lance and services, 65 many juvenile courts in the 1990s began to
increase the range of quasi-adversarial options available under
direct supervision of the court itself. While less formal than
traditional courts and often promoted by progressive judicial
leaders who wished to make courts more flexible, accessible, and
"user-friendly," these new specialty, "boutique," or "problem-solv-
ing" courts66 nonetheless keep control of various problems and
issues under judicial control and in fact define new behaviors as
appropriate for formal intervention. Most importantly, the new
courts and associated juvenile justice programs appear to have
become a primary vehicle to facilitate the "reaching down" phe-
nomenon. In some locations, for example, smoking courts, drug
and alcohol courts, teen courts, truancy courts, curfew courts,
and even "grade" courts have appeared on the juvenile justice
landscape.67 With the exception of drug courts, studies of the
impact of these new initiatives are very scarce. What is clear,
however, is that these programs and specialty courts provide new
doorways for bringing more non-criminal and low-level crime
problems once handled informally into the court process for
resolution.
Ironically, the deconstructionist idea of the court as the last
and least desirable forum for resolving complex and typically
non-legal problems seems to have been reversed by the new spe-
cialty court movement, even as (or perhaps, because) the juve-
nile court has lost jurisdiction over more serious and chronic
youth crime.68 Indeed, the new specialty court movement and
64. See Feeley & Simon, supra note 8.
65. See generally ScmwARrz, supra note 42; SUSAN GUARINO-GHEZZI &
EDWARD J. LOUGHRAN, BALANCING JUVENILE JUSTICE (1996).
66. Greg Berman &Jeffrey Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer
23 LAW & POL'Y 125 (2001).
67. E.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Children, Youth and Families Department,
In re Andrew A. (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (No. 22,891) (on file with author). See
WHITEHEAD & LAB, supra note 15.
68. Butts & Mears, supra note 13, at 177.
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related court-sponsored programs 69 seem considerably less con-
cerned with the priorities of the post-Gault court, including mini-
mizing unnecessary intervention and maximizing due process.7"
Perhaps completely lost, at least in some new court-sponsored
programs, is the concern of original diversion advocates71 that
programs, despite good intentions, may actually be harmful.72 In
that regard, there also appears to be a lack of awareness of possi-
ble criminogenic, stigmatizing influences associated with bring-
ing together large groups of troubled youth in a way that may be
likely to reinforce a deviant identity.7"
Yet, court leadership is not solely responsible for what is, in
fact, a broader based problem. Like their counterparts in other
sectors, court practitioners are often seeking to strengthen prac-
tice and avoid further erosion of their jurisdiction. Thus, while
the concerns we raise about the widening of the court mandate
in response to problems in the socialization of young people are
not unlike some of those raised by critics of diversion policies in
previous decades,74 expansionism is about more than "net-widen-
ing." Our concerns, therefore, do not imply support for a
"hands-off' or "radical nonintervention" approach as advocated
by some court critics in the 1970s.75 Indeed, at the conclusion of
this Article, we propose positive solutions that could involve the
court in a leadership role to promote a more effective, informal,
community-focused paradigm for intervention in response to
youth crime.
In summary, by direct, official, and quasi-formal interven-
tion with categories of youth not subject to court controls in
recent decades, the three components of criminal/juvenile jus-
tice expansionism have worked together to legitimize and opera-
tionalize a general erosion of formal/informal social control
boundary distinctions. This erosion has been accompanied by a
marked increase in status offenders, as well as first offenders and
69. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Children, Youth and Families Depart-
ment, In reAndrew A. (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (No. 22,891) (on file with author).
70. See GUARINO-GHEZZI & LOUGHRAN, supra note 65, at 93-101;
Bazemore, Young People, supra note 28, at 203-04.
71. Lemert, supra note 10, at 34-46; EDWIN M. SCHUR, RADICAL NONINTER-
VENTION: RETHINKING THE DELINQUENCY PROBLEM 3-4 (1973).
72. E.g., Kenneth Polk, When Less Means More: An Analysis of Destructuring
in Criminal Justice, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 358 (1987).
73. Gordon Bazemore, Delinquent Reform and the Labeling Perspective, 12
CRiM. JUST. & BEHAV. 131, 135 (1985).
74. See generally Lemert, supra note 10; Polk, supra note 72; Dean G. Rojek,
Juvenile Diversion: A Study of Community Cooptation, in READINGS IN JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY 316 (Dean G. Rojek & Gary F. Jensen eds., 1982).
75. See, e.g., SCHUR, supra note 71; SCHWARTZ, supra note 42.
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misdemeanants, being processed through juvenile courts and
placed in residential and other restrictive environments once
reserved for more serious juveniles. One of the most interesting
aspects of this new expansionism is its implications for the nature
of schools, both as institutions of informal and quasi-formal
social control, and as a potential feeder system into the juvenile
justice system. The issue of policy responses to truancy provides
an important case study for more closely examining changes in
these formal/informal boundaries.
C. Schools, Truancy, and the Structure of Social Control
Historically, school partnerships with criminal and juvenile
justice agencies have centered on the use of criminal jus-
tice officials as informational sources, with their efforts
aimed at prevention through education. Increasingly,
however, partnerships between schools and agents of the
criminal justice system are characterized by atmospheres
structured for student control and crime prevention,
rather than education, signaling important changes in the
social control mechanisms used in schools and on our
children.
76
The origins of the erosion of formal and informal bounda-
ries in the school context predate the new concerns with expan-
sionism discussed here. The criminal justice presence has been a
notable feature of the secondary education landscape since the
initial placement of school resource officers (SROs) in many of
the nation's high schools two decades ago.7 7 Historically, the ini-
tial role of criminal justice in schools was relatively non-intrusive,
focused primarily on education and prevention.78 SROs have
also clearly reinforced the discipline and security structure of
schools, both in ways that are generally applauded, as well as in
ways that have drawn significant criticism.79 For example,
schools have for some time used officers for investigation, surveil-
lance, and arrest functions, and with the recent impetus toward
zero-tolerance policies, schools have been able to "off-load" disci-
plinary responsibilities to juvenile courts and/or juvenile justice
programs. Though typically seen more as advocates for students
under their supervision, school probation officers likewise rein-
force more authoritarian components of the disciplinary struc-
76. E.g., Trulson et al., supra note 20, at 574.
77. See LAWRENCE, supra note 20.
78. E.g., Trulson et al., supra note 20, at 576.
79. See STAPLES, supra note 23.
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ture and, on occasion, may also facilitate removal of supervised
youth from school.80
A more decisive change in emphasis toward crime control is
now also seen in the "language used to refer to criminal justice
officials, their role activities, the changing architectural environ-
ment of schools, and the panoply of rules and restrictions
emphasizing suppression of criminal activity."'" Consistent with
zero tolerance, the shift in language is replete with such terms
and phrases as "combating" victimization, "fighting campus
crime," and "enforcing discipline." In some jurisdictions, job
titles for professionals once called "resource officers" or "school
liaisons" are now "security officers," "guards," "gang intelligence
officers," or "drill instructors." This language is consistent with
an apparent role change in which police activities on campus
focus more on investigatory and enforcement efforts.8 2 While
programs such as DARE and other anti-crime educational
projects continue to emphasize prevention, some schools now
use criminal justice professionals in disciplinary programs,
including school "boot camps" and "intensive supervision
programs. 8 3
Despite this new and different criminal justice presence in
schools, only in recent years has skipping school again become a
criminal/juvenile justice issue. That it should be viewed in this
way, however, is perhaps not surprising given the emphasis on
access control, surveillance, law enforcement, drug sweeps and
testing, monitoring, and crowd control that are becoming part of
daily life in many urban schools. In this context, truancy, like
other forms of rule violation and disruption of school routines, is
increasingly seen as a problem to be solved by criminal justice
methods, regardless of its causal origins.
Yet, to raise critical concerns about criminal justice involve-
ment in the educational process is not to underestimate the
scope of the problem that truancy may well present. Although
the proportion of truancy cases processed through juvenile
courts is relatively small (twenty-six percent of all formally han-
dled status offense cases), some have observed that the juvenile
justice system has become "the final stop for truants, and [is
increasingly] a mechanism for intervening with chronic
truants."8 4
80. E.g., Trulson et al., supra note 20, at 576.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 576-77; see also STAPLES, supra note 23, at 45-49.
83. Trulson et al., supra note 20, at 576-77.
84. Baker et al., supra note 24, at 2.
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Though this pattern is now well documented, less well
understood are the social control issues and new role implica-
tions for criminal justice professionals in the regulation of school
attendance. Moreover, while there is considerable evidence
pointing toward truancy's causation, policy development and
research on the impact of various intervention techniques are in
their relative infancy.
1. Understanding the Truancy Problem: Impacts and Causes
Few would question the assertion that chronic absenteeism
today increases the estrangement of young people from the edu-
cational mainstream and hence from preparation for productive
participation in the conventional labor market. In addition to
the implications for human capital and for the general well-being
of youth and families, truancy has been identified in a number of
empirical studies as a risk factor associated with substance abuse,
gang activity, and a variety of criminal activities, as well as serious
behavioral disorders in adulthood. 5 Though causal order and
robustness of some of these effects have been at issue in a num-
ber of studies, truancy, like dropping out,86 represents the tip of
the iceberg of social isolation that serves as one critical indicator
of a variety of school alienation and failure issues that may be
directly implicated in negative outcomes such as future delin-
quency and crime.8 7 Law enforcement officials in recent years
have also raised claims, though not always empirically substanti-
ated, of a linkage between high rates of truancy and daytime bur-
glary and vandalism.
8 8
Regardless of the nature of the causal paths or the potential
impact, the antecedent predictors of truancy have been rather
well established. Etiological research is relatively clear, for exam-
ple, about the multidimensional nature of the truancy problem.
While causal explanations have at times emphasized one of three
domains-the individual, the school, or the family 9-efforts to
85. E.g., AllisonJ. Bell et al., Truancy Intervention, 27J. REs. & DEv. EDUC.
203 (1994); Eileen M. Garry, Truancy: First Step to a Lifetime of Problems, Juv. JusT.
BULL. (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Preven-
tion, Wash. D.C.), Oct. 1996, at 1.
86. E.g., DELBERT S. ELLiorr & HIARWIN L. Voss, DELINQUENCY AND DROP-
OUT (1974).
87. See YOUTH DEV. & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, DELINQUENCY PREVENTION THROUGH YOUTH DEVEL-
OPMENT (1972); Denise Gottfredson, Changing School Structures to Benefit High-
Risk Youths, in UNDERSTANDING TROUBLED AND TROUBLING YOUTH 246 (Philip E.
Leone ed., 1990).
88. See generally Baker et al., supra note 24.
89. E.g., Bell et al., supra note 85.
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identify personal characteristics that set truants apart from other
students tend to implicate family and school dimensions. For
example, truants are often found to have a parent suffering from
alcoholism9 ° and to experience family histories of abuse,91 mal-
treatment, or neglect.92
The school environment itself is implicated, and in fact, the
likelihood of being truant may vary by the school a student
attends. With regard to school-related variables, truants tend to
display reading scores two years below their grade level,93 have
poor skills in a number of academic subjects,94 feel frustrated
and bored with school, remain isolated from the school cul-
ture,95 and experience more negative encounters with teachers.96
For example, a survey of students in one study revealed that
when students were asked why they were truant, school-related
variables (e.g., bullying, lack of attention to learning styles, learn-
ing disabilities, and physical impairments) dominated their
answers.
97
Thus, it is not surprising to find researchers concluding that
effectively treating the problem of chronic absenteeism requires
looking beyond the scope of the personal identities of individual
truants and focusing on school, community, and family-related
factors ranging from domestic violence to teacher neglect and
negative role models.98 In that regard, Harte notes that since
1985, the literature on absenteeism has shifted from focusing on
the student to viewing the school as part of both the problem
and the solution.99
90. E.g., Melissa Owings West & Ronald J. Prinz, Parental Alcoholism and
Childhood Psychopathology, 102 PYSCHOL. BULL. 204, 207-09 (1987).
91. Richard Famularo et al., Child Maltreatment Histories Among Runaway
and Delinquent Children, 29 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 713, 714 (1990).
92. See Garry, supra note 85.
93. David Galloway, Research Note: Truants and Other Absentees, 24J. CHILD
PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY & ALLIED DISCIPLINES 607, 609 (1983).
94. David P. Farrington, Delinquency Prevention in the 1980s, 8 J. ADOLES-
CENCE 3 (1985).
95. Richard E. Rood, Advice for Administrators: Writing the Attendance Policy,
NASSP BULL., Apr. 1989, at 22.
96. Barbara Sommer, What's Different About Truants? A Comparison Study of
Eighth-Graders, 14J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 411, 419-20 (1985).
97. William B. Berger & Susan Wind, Police Eliminating Truancy: A PET
Project, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT Bull., Feb. 2000, at 17.
98. See generally Ingersoll & Le Boeuf, supra note 25, at 2-3; Bell et al.,
supra note 85.
99. AUSTIN J. HARTE, IMPROVING SCHOOL ATTENDANCE: RESPONSIBILITY AND
CHALLENGE (1994), microformed on ERIC Identifier No. ED383042 (Educational
Resources Information Center).
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2. Truancy Intervention in Context: The Structure of
Responsibility and Leadership
While the search for explanations has clearly incorporated
multiple variables, truancy-reduction policies and practices most
often target individual students for remedial services, counseling,
or at times, simply punishment. The potential exists to concep-
tualize and implement broad truancy reduction strategies, simi-
lar to those being employed in response to bullying and related
problems. 100 But the dominant reality of truancy intervention is
typically influenced by a rather narrow set of policy frameworks
that lead to a replication of limited, student-targeted strategies
that vary only in their view of individual motivation for unex-
cused absences.10 1
While these interventions may assume multiple forms within
varying organizational structures, 10 2 when law enforcement agen-
cies assume primary leadership roles, one might expect truancy
to be defined first and foremost as a primary risk factor for
involvement in daytime crime. Consistent with boundary change
literature, we will explore the extent to which such singular defi-
nitions of the problem are reinforced by changing role adapta-
tion of criminal justice professionals. In addition, a primary
concern is that criminal justice system dominance may evoke a
"no fault" response from schools and other institutions of infor-
mal or quasi-formal social control. l'0 When they relinquish pol-
icy authority over the problem, school professionals tacitly accept
and further legitimize the crime suppression rationale in
exchange for being absolved of responsibility for troublesome
young people. This displacement of socialization functions with
a crime control response may also criminalize behaviors once
viewed in the school context as simply troublesome, or as viola-
100. BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION, supra note 9, at 219.
101. In an effort to progress beyond both generic and one-dimensional
approaches, some jurisdictions are focusing on a multi-faceted combination of
holistic problem-solving techniques targeting specific needs with a "menu" of
responses that can take the form of assistance ranging from providing health
care to making arrangements for transportation, child care (for younger sib-
lings), school clothing, and even such fundamentals as access to washing
machines or a quiet place to do homework. School-based intervention pro-
grams have also been found to be more effective if, along with attendance mon-
itoring and student counseling, they also involve parents and other citizens and
community groups; see generally HARTE, supra note 99; John Haslinger et al.,
Countering Absenteeism, Anonymity, and Apathy, 54 EDuc. LEADERSHIP 47, 47-49
(1996); MINN. DEP'T OF CHILDREN, FAMILIES, & LEARNING, supra note 22.
102. See, e.g., Baker et al., supra note 24, at 11.
103. MARK D. JACOBS, SCREWING THE SYSTEM AND MAKING IT WORK: JUvE-
NILE JUSTICE IN THE NO-FAULT SOCIETY 265-84 (1990).
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tions of institutional rules rather than legal or universal norms.
The extent to which this potential is reflected in the case study
reviewed here is among the issues explored throughout the
remainder of this article.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTHEASTERN COUNTY TRUANCY
REDUCTION AND INTERVENTION COLLABORATIVE
The program mission of the Southeastern County truancy
intervention combines several elements of crime control and a
social welfare/therapeutic perspective. Initiated by a popular
sheriff, the collaborative effort was aimed at implementing a
comprehensive approach to intervention that combined a spe-
cific and general deterrence component with assessment and fol-
low-up services on a prescriptive basis. On a continuum of
possible interventions, including secure detention for truants
that is used in a number of jurisdictions, 1°4 the initial vision of
the Southeastern County intervention falls closer to the less
intrusive end. In the following section, we present a brief over-
view of the program's operational design. Then, based on quali-
tative interviews, focus groups, and participant observations, we
provide a general description of the dominant focus of the inter-
vention itself and its implications for role adaptation on the part
of criminal justice professionals.
A. Operational Context
Although center staff and sheriff's deputies had gained
three years of experience operating a smaller truancy pick-up
program, the first year of operation of the fully-funded, multi-
component truancy center was the beginning of the 1999-2000
school year, at which point the center was equipped to accommo-
date over one hundred truants per day. A case management
component was also added, with services provided by two clinical
service provider agencies.
The primary stated goal of the Truancy Unit was to reduce
the incidence of unexcused absences from schools in Southeast-
ern County. Secondary goals were to reduce delinquent behav-
ior among processed youth and to reduce the rate of juvenile
crime during school hours.' °5 Consistent with state statutes,
104. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Children, Youth and Families Depart-
ment, In reAndrew A. (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (No. 22,891) (on file with author).
105. Funding and general political support for the program, located in
the largest city in Southeastern County (county population approximately
1,600,000), came after the number of truants processed through an interim
truancy unit had almost doubled in the 1997-98 school year, and the school
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admission requirements allow for processing youth who meet the
following criteria: (1) between the ages of six and seventeen and
currently enrolled in a Southeastern County public or private
school day school; (2) not currently suspended or expelled from
school; (3) not enrolled in a GED program; (4) not in a court-
ordered program; (5) not in a home or work study program; and




1. Processing and Intervention Focus
The decisionmaking process begins when sheriff's deputies
or other local law enforcement officers encounter youth not
accompanied by an adult during school hours. The officer is
expected to call the youth's school to confirm that he/she has
not been granted an excused absence and verify that the youth
meets the criteria for admission to the unit. In fact, with the
exception of youth currently under court-ordered supervision
(who were taken to delinquency intake), or runaway youth (who
were taken to shelters), the vast majority of unaccompanied
youth on the street met formal, legal criteria for admission to the
center. Because exclusions by virtue of excused absence, home
schooling, or GED enrollment were unlikely for an unaccompa-
nied youth, release dictated by statute was rare, and officers were
granted a great deal of discretion in processing decisions. Prima-
rily, they had to evaluate the credibility of claims for being on the
street during school hours. Though some officers established
their own guidelines for decisionmaking, such as distance from
school, and allowed a "grace period" for viewing youth as tardy
versus truant, there were no formal policies to guide these deci-
sions, and officers ranged from allowing a fifteen minute window
to two hours. Youth who were judged by officers to be truant
were transported to the Truancy Unit, located in a separate wing
of a large building also housing a centralized county juvenile
assessment center used as an intake center for youth picked up
by police for alleged delinquent behavior. Those judged to be
simply late for school-and presumably on their way to class-or
board had published an estimate that 2,700 students per day were truant during
that year.
106. A state statute implemented in 2000 changed one important crite-
rion for admission: youths who are suspended or expelled from school and are
not under the supervision of an adult, can now be picked up and taken to the
Truancy Unit. Though apparently illogical given the expressed goal of reduc-
ing truancy among processed students (i.e., by getting them back in school),
the new statute may well reinforce the more implicit, but increasingly dominant
goal of suppression of youth crime.
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those presenting other legitimate excuses for not being in
school, were released.
The experience of being processed through the Truancy
Unit Intake Room, a holding area where youth wait prior to entry
into the facility itself, is one that evokes a sensation similar to that
of being arrested and taken into custody. In this sense, it is not
unlike many other juvenile or criminal justice processing exper-
iences dominated by an emphasis on security, confiscation of
property, regimentation, and authoritarian discipline. The
approach of the police officers in charge at this stage is business-
like; youth are searched, property is confiscated, and vital data
(e.g., name and phone number of parent or guardian) are col-
lected. The tone of officers' interaction with the young people is
generally respectful, but there is no tolerance for disruptive
behavior or loud talking. After an intake form is completed on
all youth and entered for processing, the Department of Juvenile
Justice (DJJ) database is checked to see if there is an outstanding
pick-up order, or if the youth is under the jurisdiction of the
court (i.e., probation, commitment, or conditional release). If
the youth is listed in the database as currently on probation, the
DJJ probation officer is contacted to verify that information. It is
at this point that the connection between the response to truancy
as troublesome behavior and juvenile justice is made most
directly. Specifically, if the youth is on probation for burglary,
auto theft, or a crime of violence, a sheriffs deputy files a viola-
tion report, and the youth is transferred to the "delinquency
side" of the assessment center.10 7
The intervention itself during the time at the center is mini-
mal, involving essentially a basic assessment, brief interview, and
enforced silence. After initial processing, each youth is brought
into a large "classroom" and seated at a desk where he/she is told
to stay until told to move. A classroom monitor (a school board
employee) then explains the rules of conduct while at the Tru-
ancy Unit, which require that students must: (1) place their
heads on their desks while they are seated; (2) raise their hand if
they have a question; and (3) not talk to anyone unless asked a
question by a staff person. While truant youth complete an
107. The rules also note that the Truancy Unit classroom is a School
Board facility and that failure to follow the rules may result in disciplinary
action. In perhaps the starkest illustration of the enforcement emphasis and
the blending of socialization and formal social control, truant youth are
informed that any time their disruptive behavior inside the facility warrants,
they may be transferred to the "delinquency side" of the larger facility in which
the truancy program is housed. Transferred youths are then charged with a
delinquent act under the state juvenile justice code.
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assessment tool at their desks, clerical support staff members col-
lect information on attendance and other background character-
istics and create a file for each youth. The assessment tool is
placed in the file, and then used by an intake assessment coun-
selor to conduct an interview with the youth. A counselor
reviews the contents of the file, checks the accuracy and veracity
of the information with the youth, and may then attempt to gain
additional assessment information from an informal interview.
At this time, some informal counseling may be provided regard-
ing school problems and the importance of attendance. Based
on assessment scores and the general assessment notes recorded
by intake counselors, a youth may be referred to school for reme-
dial services or to a case manager for other assistance.
Students may stay at the facility for a maximum of six hours,
by which time the youth must be released to parents, guardians,
or a competent adult willing to sign for them. The parent or
other adult picks up his child at the center or meets the child at
home after the child is delivered there by an officer.
2. Intervention Focus and a Summary of Impact Results
As noted in the introduction, partners in the collaboration
sought and secured funding for a multi-component intervention
approach that included assessment and referral for remedial and
clinical services. However, despite the emphasis of truancy
center clinical staff, and the fact that a substantial proportion of
youth received referrals, independent surveys of parents con-
ducted as part of the program evaluation revealed that a relative
handful of these youths (about 33, or 8% of a sample of 270
processed youth) could be confirmed to have received any fol-
low-up service. 10 8 Hence, for various reasons to be discussed in
subsequent sections of this Article, the services component of the
truancy center was eventually phased out.
108. GORDON BAZEMORE, LESLIE LEIP & JEANNE STINCHCOMB, Evaluation
Report from the [Southeastern] County Truancy Reduction and Intervention
Program 57 (2001) [hereinafter EVALUATION REPORT ] (on file with authors).
(The name of the county has been redacted from the report to retain confiden-
tiality.) See also Gordon Bazemore, Jeanne Stinchcomb & Leslie Leip, Scared
Smart or Bored Straight: Testing a Deterrence Logic in an Evaluation of Police-Led Tru-
ancy Intervention, 21 JusT. Q. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 34, on file with
authors).
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a. The Logic of Deterrence
The primary "intervention theory"1 °9 connecting this initia-
tive with both reductions in subsequent unexcused absences and
prevention of future delinquent behavior was therefore specific
deterrence." 0 Although critics may view this theory somewhat
dubiously as the primary basis for truancy reduction,11 a logical
linkage was perceived by program staff between these interven-
tions and future truancy and delinquency.
Simply put, according to Southeastern County Truancy Unit
program managers and staff, a primary emphasis of the above-
described truancy protocol was to make the experience at the
center as unpleasant as possible. Moreover, consistent with the
classic deterrence model that seeks to maximize the swiftness,
certainty, and severity of punishment, 1 2 an intensive deployment
of special units and truancy patrol vehicles in targeted areas
greatly increased the likelihood of apprehension, while expe-
dited delivery to the center and rapid processing made the pun-
ishment almost immediate. Inside the center, certainty was
achieved by consistent application of strict rules of conduct,
including enforced silence. Though not necessarily viewed as
explicitly painful, and thus perhaps of limited severity, staff
argued that the lack of stimulation of any kind, educational or
109. See Carol Weiss, How Can Theory-Based Evaluation Make Greater Head-
way?, 21 EVALUATION REV. 501 (1997).
110. E.g., ANNE L. SCHNEIDER, DETERRENCE AND JUVENILE CRIME: RESULTS
FROM A NATIONAL POLICY EXPERIMENT (1990); Mark C. Stafford & Mark Warr, A
Reconceptualization of General and Specific Deterrence: A Critical Review, 30 J. Rs.
CRIME & DELINQ. 123 (1993). The specific deterrence focus in Southeastern
County is also coupled with a general deterrence emphasis that assumes that
would-be truants will learn that skipping school could result in being caught
and taken to the center. Similarly, proponents of the initiative assumed that
the threat of officers patrolling neighborhoods for truants would deter youth
planning daytime crime. Though program administrators and the sheriffs
office also claimed a reduction in daytime crime based in part on the presence
of truant officers on patrol in the neighborhoods, this general deterrence
hypothesis is not easily tested without knowledge of influence on motive and
strong control groups. While the specific deterrence focus, in addition to the
basic assessment and service referral component, provided the primaryjustifica-
tion for the program, general deterrence could have been accomplished in
other less expensive ways (e.g., by simply picking up truants consistently and
returning them to school with a warning or citation).
111. See, e.g., Baker et al., supra note 24, at 41; Ingersoll & LeBouef, supra
note 25, at 2-3; see generally HARE, supra note 99.
112. See generally SCHNEIDER, supra note 110; Raymond Paternoster, The
Deterrent Effect of the Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment: A Review of the
Evidence and Issues, 4 JUST. Q. 173 (1987).
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otherwise, ensured that the center would not be perceived by
anyone as, in any way, enjoyable or interesting.
Empirical studies report mixed results ranging from moder-
ately positive to inverse relationships between the threat of pun-
ishment and future offending." 3 From a deterrence perspective,
the experience of truancy unit processing and intervention may
have had any of a number of impacts: (1) reduce future truancy
and delinquency; (2) fail to produce an effect; or (3) have a neg-
ative impact. For many students, avoiding another day of
enforced silence (and general aggravation) could provide a
threat sufficient to deter them from skipping school and offend-
ing, or at least reduce the frequency of this behavior in order to
minimize the likelihood of detection. For such students, the
experience itself might also serve as a "wake-up call," or deterrent
that stifles further involvement in these behaviors-or alterna-
tively triggers parental and other adult supportive responses that
steer the youth back to a path of regular attendance. In the lat-
ter case, the so-called "deterrent" effect may be less about the
threat of spending the day in the center per se and much more
about what will happen when their parents find out, and/or what
knowledge of their stay at the center might do to their reputation
at school among both teachers and peers.
b. Impact Findings
In a pragmatic world, if the intervention achieved its objec-
tives of reducing truancy and delinquent behavior, some of the
other concerns raised herein about the loss of informal social
control and expansion of system boundaries might be of less con-
cern. But impact findings from a recent evaluation of this tru-
ancy center based on a quasi-experimental design
1" 4 suggest that
this intervention was not successful by empirically designated
outcome standards. When random samples of youths stopped by
police for truancy and processed at the center were compared
with those who were stopped but not processed, processed youth
had lower rates of truancy during a one-month period after
processing, but significantly higher rates in a more long-term
period that included the remainder of the school year. The
authors concluded that while the deterrence strategy appeared
to have a moderate short-term impact, in the long run, it
113. E.g., Paternoster, supra note 112; Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V.
Clarke, Introduction to THE REASONING CRIMINAL 1, 5-10 (Derek B. Cornish &
Ronald V. Clarke eds., 1986); SCHNEIDER, supra note 110.
114. Bazemore, Stinchcomb, & Leip, supra note 108 (manuscript at
31-33).
20041
548 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 18
appeared to increase truancy and, moreover, had no impact on
delinquent behavior.
While the reasons for these findings are not entirely clear, it
may be helpful to consider the specific deterrence hypothesis
that young people experimenting with truancy might, as a result
of the experience of being apprehended and processed, avoid
future truancy due to concern about the consequences of future
apprehension. In a sense, one could potentially reason that
processed youth might be "shocked" into increased school
attendance by the experience of center processing. 1 5 Such
shock, if it occurs, would presumably be less salient the second or
third time around, a presumption that is in part confirmed by a
subsequent increase in truancy, as well as by a significant rela-
tionship between a tendency toward prior truancy and delin-
quency and similar post-processing truancy and delinquent
behavior.116 Moreover, calculating the precise level of punish-
ment severity required to effectively implement deterrence-based
strategies is extremely difficult, and even the most salient effects
of threats and punishment are likely to be short-lived. 17 Deter-
rence logic also suggests that when threats are not followed
through, an initial decrease in offense behavior might be fol-
lowed by a return to previous patterns. It may be the case that
after two or more punitive responses, the offender becomes so
accustomed to the punishment that it is no longer something to
be feared. In addition, according to some research, punishment
may also produce a counter-deterrent effect, when individuals
whose behavior is the target of change exhibit a "defiance reac-
tion,"1 8 and in fact increase investment in the behavior of con-
cern. A different kind of counter-deterrent effect more
consistent with labeling theory" 9 might also explain the increase
in truancy among processed youth by suggesting that a young
person experiencing a kind of status degradation ceremony
might increase involvement in truancy because the experience of
being processed causes an internalization of a dominant identity
115. Contra JAMES 0. FINCKENAUER & PATRICIA W. GAVIN, SCARED
STRAIGHT: THE PANACEA PHENOMENON REVISITED (1999).
116. Bazemore, Stinchcomb & Leip, supra note 108.
117. Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects
of Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 261, 269-70 (1984);
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION, supra note 9.
118. E.g., Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A The-
ory of the Criminal Sanction, 30 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 445 (1993).
119. SCHUR, supra note 71; HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN
SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1963).
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as a troublemaker, and thereby normalizes truancy and promotes
continued involvement in this behavior.
120
In the absence of data on how the intervention was actually
perceived by students, the authors could not claim that the
impact evaluation provides a perfect test of the deterrence
hypothesis. We suggest, however, that the quasi-experimental
study provides an appropriate assessment of deterrence as a prac-
tical policy approach to truancy. That is, the strict discipline
focus, though perhaps imperfect in delivery of the appropriate
severity of punishment or the threat of future consequences,
seems typical of what agencies are likely to replicate in imple-
menting a county-wide anti-truancy initiative. Hence, these data
shed doubt on the capacity of such efforts to deter truant youth
from future unexcused absences, as well as on the capacity of a
law-enforcement-led coalition to implement a broad multidimen-
sional strategy. These concerns are addressed further in the case
study analysis that follows.
IV. CASE STUDY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Despite the negative impact findings, the Southeastern
County initiative presents an opportunity for learning that may
generalize the theory about criminal justice responses to
problems in schools and institutions of informal control. In par-
ticular, the manner in which the collaboration evolved and incor-
porated interests of the various stakeholders contains valuable
lessons for those wishing to replicate this design or develop alter-
native truancy intervention approaches.
Notably, the fact that the center continues to operate
today-albeit without the services component-suggests that
negative evaluation results pertinent to primary goals (i.e., tru-
ancy and delinquency reduction) may be deemed irrelevant as
long as an intervention initiative appears to be meeting other
core needs. We suggest that these needs are primarily those that
can be best understood with reference to the primary compo-
nents of the expansionist agenda.
A. Truancy Intervention and Zero Tolerance
First, zero-tolerance logic provided a strong ideological and
normative justification for relaxing barriers to police access to
young people who are not in school during regular hours. Such
justification also involved little concern about granting officers
120. See generally Lemert, supra note 10 (arguing that court stigma nor-
malizes delinquency and promotes continued involvement).
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wide discretion about whether to give credence to explanations
of tardiness, excused absences, or even suspension. Zero toler-
ance also provided justification for growing school reluctance to
accept certain young people back into school when returned by
police after processing. The ultimate signs that some school staff
may have viewed the center as a means of getting rid of trouble-
some students were the reported calls from school personnel to
request pick up and processing of non-truant youth who were
simply causing problems in the classroom. Though infrequent,
such calls were symbolic of the salience of the zero-tolerance
message indicating that schools (and ultimately, families and
community groups), were allowed to transfer responsibility for
troublesome students to the greater authority of criminal justice
professionals.
Despite the less than positive impact of truancy center inter-
vention on school attendance and subsequent delinquency, get-
ting young people off the streets, whatever its true value in crime
control, apparently began to take precedence over due process
concerns. This incapacitation approach to truancy further
strengthened what appears to be a new feeder system that more
quickly transitions troublesome young people directly from
school and into the juvenile justice system. In light of the recent
proclamations of "success" in the somewhat parallel urban initia-
tives that encourage aggressive policing approaches to disor-
der,12' it is logical to assume that such zero-tolerance responses
to truancy may continue to operate and spread in influence, even
in the face of dubious or negative evidence of effectiveness in
goal attainment. 122 Moreover, as we suggest below, criteria for
success and outcome indicators may even be adjusted to fit an
intervention consistent with a managerial agenda based on
incapacitation.
B. New Faith in Courts and Juvenile Justice Programs
Through a specialized response that promised greater effi-
ciency and effectiveness, the Southeastern County Truancy initia-
tive provided a clear example of the trend in juvenile justice
toward resuming jurisdiction over behaviors once considered off-
limits to the justice system. In short, the center operationalized
many of the core elements of the expansionist tendency in crimi-
121. E.g., William J. Bratton, The New York City Police Department's Civil
Enforcement of Quality-of-Life Crimes, 3 J. LAw & POL'Y 447 (1995); contra HAR-
cOURT, supra note 59, at 23-58.
122. E.g., FINCKENAUER & GAVIN, supra note 115.
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nal and juvenile justice outlined earlier and illustrates many of
the problems with this new development.
Though the court itself played a relatively limited role in this
endeavor, the truancy collaborative (like the specialized courts
and other related programs that have recently begun to "reach
down" to intervene in response to youthful misbehavior) seemed
oblivious to the possible negative impact on the identities and
futures of young people potentially stigmatized by such interven-
tion. And unlike earlier times, when questions were raised as a
matter of course about the potential harm of intervention,
123
partners in the initiative never seemed to doubt that a collabora-
tive of criminal justice and social service agencies operating a
centralized truancy approach would be capable of making things
better, rather than worse, for young truants, their families and
their communities.
Specifically, as reflected in the message of specialized courts,
juvenile justice and social service partners in particular placed
extraordinary faith in the value of (1) a coordinated, centralized
approach that isolated the truancy problem from the school and
community; (2) an assessment to identify problems of individual
truants, based on the assumption that collecting data on these
problems would lead to remedial or therapeutic solutions; and
(3) a specialized focus on truancy, with faith that social service
experts could remedy the problem. Though never really tested
as a result of implementation shortcomings, the conclusion that
this strategy could not be easily operationalized without sacrific-
ing some component (i.e., services) is a lesson in itself. More
important, however, was the rather dubious nature of the strat-
egy of isolating the truancy problem from its origins in the
school and community (also consistent with zero-tolerance val-
ues) and ultimately, the pragmatic managerial focus of the multi-
agency collaborative led by the Southeastern County Sheriffs
Department.
C. Managing the Problem: Boundary Erosion, Role Adaptation, and
the Structure of Leadership
The third element of the new expansionism-more power-
ful, untraditional criminal justice/social service partnerships-
also played an important role in the truancy initiative. As the
driving force in what was otherwise a loosely coupled collabora-
tive, the sheriffs office provided the political capital needed to
gain widespread acceptance for the initiative. For example,
obtaining initial funding was arguably easier, and financial sup-
123. E.g., SCHUR, supra note 71; Polk, supra note 72.
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port has remained at a high level despite questionable evaluation
results, even at a time when juvenile justice funding for preven-
tion programs has been reduced across the state. From another
perspective, such general credibility could also have allowed the
collaboratiive to experiment with one or more of several more
creative alternative strategies. Such approaches, for example,
might have allowed for different configurations of responsibili-
ties, including those that might attempt to maximize the role of
school reform, or to encourage police agencies to assume a more
service-oriented role beyond the traditional scope of law enforce-
ment.'24 However, opportunities were missed to promote a truly
collaborative, multi-modal intervention in which juvenile justice,
social services, the court, schools, and community groups were
equally involved. Rather, the leadership structure became almost
exclusively centered around the demands of identifying, inter-
cepting, and processing truants.
1. Who's in Charge? Agenda Control
Problems associated with shared responsibility and coopera-
tive efforts are to be expected in the initial stages of large collab-
orative efforts. Indeed, early stages of the process evaluation
revealed emerging problems with developing a clear definition
of partner roles, as well as the interagency understanding, accept-
ance of responsibility, and effective overall leadership needed to
coordinate the efforts of school, law enforcement, service provid-
ers, and community resources. Yet, weaknesses in communica-
tion and follow-up were overshadowed by the strengths of the
emerging leadership and management structure. Despite the
intent to develop a multi-agency partnership with a broader
focus than law enforcement, the sheriffs staff exercised primary
leadership both in bringing the coalition together and in manag-
ing the internal and external operations of the center.
Although the social services component provided one
important rationale for funding, as the initiative progressed, it
appeared to move even further away from a multi-dimensional
model and more in the direction of a crime control model-a
focus clearly illustrated by the imbalance of expenditures for the
time allocated by sheriffs deputies to intercepting and process-
ing truants, compared with the funds expended on services and
assessment.' 25 From this fiscal perspective, responsibility for the
overall strategy appears to have moved further away from school
124. E.g., Baker et al., supra note 24, at 8; George L. Kelling & Mark H.
Moore, The Evolving Strategy of Policing, PERSP. ON POLICING, Nov. 1998, at 1.
125. See EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 108.
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and community ownership and closer to criminal justice
ownership.
2. Boundary Erosion and Role Adaptation
The Southeastern County Sheriff's Department in some
ways exemplifies the challenge to traditional professional bound-
aries among police agencies today. As a case study, the interven-
tion that the department led is also relevant to the debate about
role adaptation in terms of responses to problems of crime, dis-
order, and troublesome behavior.' 26 Undoubtedly, classic con-
cerns exist about police serving as 'judge and jury," judges
demonstrating bias in cases that involve advocacy, and similar
separation of powers issues. Nevertheless, some view boundary
flexibility as an indication that rigidity is breaking down in order
to allow for more targeted, responsive, flexible, and effective
intervention. 127 Such intervention has been heralded as ulti-
mately achieving a "more ambitious form of justice" 2 based on
a broadening of professional roles.
The transfer of responsibilities for responding to youth
crime and troublesome behavior from social service agencies to
law enforcement and/or prosecution-led collaboratives seems
likely to continue in the future. Moreover, there is no reason to
suggest that such shared responsibilities and role adaptation on
the part of all stakeholders in such partnerships could not result
in more effective outcomes. However, in this case study, there
was little to indicate that law enforcement officers had modified
their traditional roles to support either the educational mission
of the school or the social service mission of agencies addressing
the needs of youth and families with problems related to truancy,
and there was no evidence of community participation in the tru-
ancy initiative.
This initiative presented many natural opportunities for
such innovation. It might be expected, for example, that sher-
iffs' deputies assigned to the truancy unit would not only provide
traditional law enforcement services, but also, to some degree,
take on a more interdisciplinary role.'2 ' Such role adaptation
might, for example, manifest itself in officer provision of assis-
tance and support, thereby enhancing credibility for the ser-
vice/remediation aspect of the truancy initiative or the broader
126. See generally Friel, supra note 12.
127. See CLEAR & KARP, supra note 23; Friel, supra note 12.
128. Moore, supra note 17, at 12.
129. See generally MALCOM K. SPARRow ET AL., BEYOND 911 (1990); Coles &
Kelling, supra note 17.
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educational and socialization agenda of the school.13 ° Because
of their role in picking up students and transporting them to the
center (and ultimately to school or home), officers inevitably
spent far more time with youth, school personnel, and parents
than social service workers did. This provided opportunities for
officers to get to know some of the these young people infor-
mally, and perhaps provide informal counseling of the type
noted in some studies of youth encounters with officers in com-
munity policing initiatives.' While officers admittedly are not
therapists, some relate well and more naturally to young people
than do social workers operating from the perspective of a
clinical agenda. But the fact that little interaction occurred
other than 'Just the facts" questioning and a few warnings to sit
still and be quiet suggests that this more positive, relational inter-
action was not encouraged and may actually have been discour-
aged in the interest of time.
Additionally, officers could have been a critical source of
information that was often missing to the social services profes-
sionals who-by virtue of the large number of youth being
processed and liability concerns-were forced to focus almost all
of their attention on emergency cases or those with immediate
need for an intensive response to chronic problems. Officers
also had ample opportunity to support the socialization and
remediation mission and, indeed, might have been more persua-
sive than counselors and social workers in convincing youth to
attend tutoring or special education classes, or in persuading
parents of the importance of their role in ensuring follow-
through with referrals and monitoring subsequent attendance.
As the initiative continued, however, case managers almost uni-
formly reported difficulties in getting parents and young people
to follow-up with service referrals-or even to return their calls-
and often experienced weak, if any, cooperation from school
authorities. Most officers seemed to take little interest in under-
standing or supporting the services component and little, if any,
investment in sheriffs department staffing was allocated towards
enhancing the integrity and quality of the service intervention
component. In fact, some observations of officer/youth interac-
tions during transportation back to school or to the student's
130. E.g., Trulson et al., supra note 20, at 585.
131. Cf Gordon Bazemore & Scott Senjo, Police Encounters with Juveniles
Revisited: An Exploratory Study of Themes and Styles in Community Policing, 20 POLIC-
ING: INT'LJ. POLICE STRATEGY & MGMT. 60 (1997) (arguing that many commu-
nity police officers developed supportive mentorship relationships with youth
in trouble and assisted families in crisis).
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home suggested that deputies were often unaware of referrals
made by social service staff and unfamiliar with service providers.
Finally, since a number of the sheriffs deputies had previous
training and experience in prevention and education as school
resource officers, many could have been involved in educational
activities in the facility, had such activities been part of the
center's agenda. Yet, despite the sheriffs office commitment to
programs such as DARE and other widely supported and well-
resourced police prevention programs in the schools, administra-
tors chose not to utilize officers for such educational/preventive
functions during the four to six hours that most youth were
being held at the center.
Realistically, all performance incentives for the officers
seemed to be tied to the number of youth not in school who were
processed at the center, which minimized the time devoted to
informal interaction in favor of maximizing both the volume of
truant arrests and the speed at which youths could be trans-
ported to the center. Little, if any, of the rather substantial
investment of law enforcement staffing in the initiative was allo-
cated to enhancing the integrity or quality of the services or the
educational component. Hence, most officers retained a highly
directive law enforcement posture-pick-ups were methodical
and driven by concern for volume; processing was intended to
quickly gather basic information; monitoring while in the center
was focused on order maintenance and making the experience
as devoid of stimulation as possible; contact with families was lim-
ited to only what was necessary according to the letter of the law;
and contact with the school was similarly focused on efficiency
concerns.
With regard to role adaptation, it was ironically the service
professionals who were expected to adapt to the law enforce-
ment/crime control focus, rather than vice versa. Department of
Juvenile Justice (DJJ) probation officers, for example, received
complaints from officers because they generally refused to file
truancy-related violations of probation for youth under their
supervision who had been processed through the center. While
enforcing probation regulations and filing violations is obviously
not the only role of probation staff, this policing/enforcement
function represented a core expectation that reflected the over-
all coercive nature of the intervention.
13 2
132. Sheriff's deputies might instead have sought to work with local juve-
nile justice managers on how probation staff might partner with them on advo-
cacy efforts to keep youth in school or on efforts to monitor attendance. Juvenile
justice and law enforcement also could have worked together to develop and to
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In summary, the expectations of social service and school
board professionals were to some degree adjusted to fit a crime
control and incapacitation agenda. However, little, if any, adap-
tation in the law enforcement role was apparent. The sheriffs
office leadership, combined with the apparent lack of incentive
and encouragement to modify or "stretch" professional roles, was
a major factor in creating and sustaining the crime control focus
of the intervention.
3. Managerial Solutions, Initiative Goals, and the Redefinition
of Success
To the extent that multiple criminal justice and social ser-
vice entities cooperated in its implementation, it could be argued
that the truancy initiative was to some degree successful. Yet, the
crime control agenda that attained clear dominance in the initia-
tive was not one that seemed to represent the professional inter-
ests of each stakeholder. While no partner appeared to actively
oppose such a focus, this dominance was due not so much to a
shared commitment to the law enforcement emphasis as it was to
the failure to mobilize concern for the viability of the service pro-
gram and to the minimal level of participation of school adminis-
trators and staff in the process. Indeed, there was no "in-school"
component of the initiative other than the unmet assumption
that processed youth would receive high priority for school fol-
low-up service. In fact, the initial collaborative commitment to
services and remediation soon gave way to sheriffs department
leadership in maximizing incapacitation. Despite the demon-
strated failure to deter processed truants and even apparently to
avoid making the problem worse for processed youth, 133 the col-
laborative could claim something perhaps even more valuable: a
sense of having "dealt with" the problem.
The incapacitation focus reflects a new pragmatic approach
in criminal justice in which leadership seeks to achieve the most
politically acceptable solution. This "managerial" criminal jus-
tice approach13 4 may deflect attention from traditional goals
such as reducing recidivism and/or crime rates in favor of shift-
ing toward more expedient objectives that can be viewed as "han-
dling" the problem. In the current case, if specific deterrence
had failed and services were not provided, it was nonetheless pos-
nurture neighborhood mentors and guardians for truants on probation; they
might have developed agreements to have probation officers take home youth
on probation who had been processed at the Truancy Center.
133. See Bazemore, Leip & Stinchcomb, supra note 108.
134. Feeley & Simon, supra note 8.
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sible to claim that incapacitating youth not in school during
school hours was reducing daytime crime by making processed
youth ineligible to commit such crime.
The incentive structure associated with this "managerial"
focus on temporary crime control through incapacitation was
best illustrated by what was referred to by truancy center officers
as "sweeps day." On the first Wednesday of each month, officers
mobilize for large-scale arrests joined by members of local police
forces throughout the county and school resource officers, as a
show of force and indication of seriousness of the crackdown on
truants. On a morning in September 2000, for example,
researchers observed some forty young people being brought to
the center and processed in a period of approximately two hours.
The symbolic importance of sweeps day for understanding the
incentive structure for officers involved in the truancy initiative is
that it indicates in a more extreme form the ongoing operation
of a quota system that gives ultimate priority to getting young
people off the streets and into the truancy center for process-
ing-ultimately, as a crime control strategy.
Arguments in favor of this incapacitation approach to tru-
ancy that maximizes efforts to intercept young people have
strong parallels with justifications for the focus on disorder in
aggressive, order-maintenance policing.135 The growing consen-
sus among researchers that the widely accepted premise of "bro-
ken windows" policing efforts1" 6 directed at curbing disorder will
reduce serious crime is conceptually and empirically flawed. At
best, disorder is a secondary, or even spurious, variable in a
causal chain where "collective efficacy"-the willingness and
capacity of citizens to exercise informal control
13 7 -is the pri-
mary antecedent causal factor.
1 38
Similarly, truancy policies based on incapacitation or gen-
eral deterrence premises assume without sufficient empirical evi-
dence that daytime crimes are more likely to be committed by
truants than by other juveniles and adults. In so doing, propo-
nents may spuriously attribute any reduction in daytime crimes
to aggressive incapacitation of truants or to deterrence-based
threats of expanded enforcement and additional consequences
135. Contra HARCOURT, supra note 59 at 23-58.
136. E.g., GEORGE L. KELLING & C.M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS:
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES (1996).
137. Sampson et al., supra note 31, at 918.
138. Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Disorder in Urban
Neighborhoods: Does It Lead to Crime?, NAT'L INST. JUsT. RES. BRIEF, Feb. 2001, at 1,
available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/186049.pdf (on file with the
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
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that may have little relationship to the source of the problem.
Despite lack of impact, or negative impact, on community capac-
ity or young people themselves, the intervention in question can
be vaguely justified by a general deterrence logic only if one is
willing to assume that truants are, first, more likely to be or
become offenders, and second, are likely to be discouraged from
offending and unexcused absences by the threat of truancy pick-
up and processing. The incapacitation argument, while requir-
ing fewer such interdependent assumptions, does require that
the right individuals-those who would have committed crimes-
are incapacitated.' 39
Success in achieving even formally articulated goals such as
reducing truancy is, of course, not a necessary requirement for
continued support for a program or initiative.140 Though the
truancy intervention failed in meeting one of its primary goals-
in this case, unexcused absences among processed youths-the
claim of reductions in daytime crime as an apparent (or self-evi-
dent) result of incapacitating or deterring truant would-be
offenders appears in Southeastern County, for the time being, to
be justification enough. With the proper political clout, rein-
forced by the strength of system collaboratives led by law enforce-
ment and prosecutors, such evidence-free approaches may, once
in place, become self-justifying. Like "order maintenance" polic-
ing, the expansionist policy behind such youth justice initiatives
is grounded in a unique view of the world and of those who vio-
late social norms.14 ' Moreover, the dominant policy lens of
expansionism in turn shapes future policy-making options. Of
even greater importance perhaps is the fact that these policies
and perspectives are, as Harcourt suggests, reinforced by the very
practices they are used to justify:
When we assess policing strategies and punitive practices,
we need to think about how they will effect our percep-
tions.... how they will, for instance, influence the way we
interpret the propensities of the homeless person, of the
139. Though they emphasized specific deterrence and (initially) sup-
ported the services component, sheriff's office proponents had also sold the
initiative as a way to reduce property crime rates in affected neighborhoods in
the county. This logic was based on the assumption that truant youth were
committing much daytime crime and that processing would reduce opportuni-
ties for offending, i.e., an incapacitation effect.
140. Cf FINKENHAUER & GAVIN, supra note 115 (arguing that Scared
Straight and similar "shock" oriented delinquency intervention and prevention
programs continue to enjoy wide popularity despite repeated empirical studies
demonstrating that these programs increase delinquency among participants).
141. See generally MALES, supra note 48.
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unattached adult, the rowdy teenager.... We need to...
examine how they create us as modem subjects. Our intel-
lectual and conceptual frameworks-as citizens and
researchers-are shaped in part by the punitive practices
we experience. . . . [P]ropensities [and] human nature
may well be the product of the policing and punitive prac-
tices that surround US.
1 4 2
The truancy reduction strategies illustrated in this case
study, and similar initiatives that we have identified as part of the
new juvenile justice expansionist trend (e.g., curfew enforce-
ment, specialized courts, and assessment centers), are different
from the more aggressive order maintenance interventions in
one important way. Because of the benevolent motives of provid-
ing service and remedial and therapeutic assistance generally
associated with social welfare and juvenile justice treatment and
prevention programs, front-end initiatives that may have unin-
tended negative consequences have largely escaped critical analy-
sis. They are similar to these other forms of expansionism,
however, in one important respect. That is, in the pragmatic
world of zero-tolerance "managerial" criminal justice,
143 effec-
tiveness in achieving the most immediately practical outcomes-
e.g., incapacitation rather than reduction in recidivism or pre-
vention-may be justification enough, despite continued failure
to achieve primary stated objectives.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Old and New Policy Lenses: Libertarian and Restorative
Justice Perspectives
At its inception, the Southeastern County truancy interven-
tion was characterized by an understanding of the truancy prob-
lem as seen through two "policy lenses.
1 44 First, a social welfare!
therapeutic lens places emphasis on social deprivation that may
result in psychological problems or learning disabilities as the
primary causal factors. Both problems prevent the student from
keeping up with his/her age group, make adjustment to school
difficult, and thus encourage withdrawal in the form of truancy.
Solutions to psychological problems typically involve referral for
counseling of some kind, while learning problems are viewed as
deficits to be addressed by remedial education. Though poten-
142. HARCOURT, supra note 59, at 242-43.
143. See Feely & Simon, supra note 8.
144. See Helen Ingram & Anne Schneider, The Social Construction of Target
Populations, 23 ADMIN. & Soc'v 333, 351-53 (1991).
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tially broad-based and preventive, both, like the solutions pro-
posed by the Progressives who founded the juvenile court,145 are
often individualized and reactive responses to young people that
do not attempt to address broader causal issues.' 4 6 Second,
through the crime control lens, the truant may be viewed primarily
as a troublesome or delinquent youth whose motivation for tru-
ancy is part of a general pattern of commitment to youth crime
and antisocial behavior-and, by virtue of not being in school,
presents a public safety risk. This view is expected to be more
dominant in programs initiated by criminal justice agencies and
may lead to a variety of approaches to the problem, ranging from
pre-adjudicatory detention of truant youths to appearance before
"truancy courts," 4 7 processing through a variety of truancy cen-
ters such as the one examined in this study, school-based "Boot
Camps," 148 parental sanctioning approaches, or referral to other
special programs.
149
Regardless of the strength of implementation, most of the
time both deterrence and therapeutic or remedial responses to
truancy will arguably miss the "target" or source of the problem.
Both crime control and social welfare lenses lead to problem def-
initions that promote professionally-driven, individualized solu-
tions. In contrast, what is often needed is a strengthening of
informal control or guardianship and/or informal support and
resources that might, for example, maximize the role of families,
friends, neighbors, and teachers as "natural helpers."'151 Addi-
tionally, as appears to be the case in Southeastern County, these
lenses may neglect consideration of the role of schools in the
truancy problem. While greater in some truancy initiatives than
others, 151 the role of the school in Southeastern County-once
the initiative was underway-seemed almost an afterthought.
The larger lesson here appears to be that once an issue has been
145. Cf PLA-rr, supra note 23.
146. See CAROL PASTERNAK, WHY ISN'T JOHNNY IN SCHOOL? EFFECTIVE
STRATEGIES FOR ATTENDANCE, IMPROVEMENT AND TRUANCY PREVENTION (1986);
Garry, supra note 85.
147. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Children, Youth and Families Depart-
ment, In reAndrew A. (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (No. 22,891) (on file with author).
148. E.g., Trulson et al., supra note 20.
149. E.g., Baker et al., supra note 24; Ingersoll & LeBoeuf, supra note 25.
150. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, WALKING OUR TALK IN THE NEIGHBOR-
HOODS: PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN PROFESSIONALS AND NATURAL HELPERS (2002),
available at http://www.aecf.org/initiatives/familytofamily/tools/16936.pdf (on
file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy); Bazemore,
Young People, supra note 28, at 226.
151. E.g., Baker et al., supra note 24.
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defined primarily as a criminal justice problem, criminal justice
solutions will dominate.
1. LimitingJustice System Intervention
There is, of course, another lens for viewing the truancy
problem that would place strong restrictions on intervention
based on doubts about the fairness, appropriateness, and effec-
tiveness of either crime control or social service approaches.
Through the libertarian lens,' 5 2 young people engaged in minor
crimes and trouble are viewed as participants in relatively normal
and generally episodic behavior. From this perspective, if left
alone and not stigmatized, these young people will naturally
"grow out of' such behaviors. 5 ' Even the most benevolent inter-
vention programs are therefore viewed as potentially harmful
due to the likelihood that they will "widen the net" by bringing
more young people into what is perceived to be a system from
which it is difficult to exit.154 The diversion experience of the
1970s and 1980s-as well as problems with the new expansionist
tendencies discussed in this Article-at first blush gives a great
deal of credibility to this critique. Unfortunately, however, the
libertarian/noninterventionist tendency is one that too easily
minimizes or ignores both perceptions of citizen safety and genu-
ine conflict and disorder at the neighborhood level.
Though we have suggested that formal criminal justice and
social service solutions may indeed do more harm than good,
especially in addressing non-criminal problems, a non-interven-
tionist response that appears to suggest that problems will go
away simply by ignoring them is often disrespectful to communi-
ties. Such a response is therefore both practically and politically
untenable. Indeed, in the context of boundary erosion and juve-
nile justice expansionism, apparent neglect of problems viewed
as the responsibility of government agencies leaves a vacuum of
social control that ironically may increase political support for
policy approaches such as the Southeastern County truancy initi-
ative and then shield them from critical examination.
1 55 While
152. See generally GUARINO-GHEzZI & LOUGHRAN, supra note 65; HERBERT
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1967).
153. E.g., SCHUR, supra note 71.
154. Polk, supra note 72, 358-78.
155. Although a handful of writers give primary emphasis to the role of
public "socializing" institutions such as schools in the analysis of the causes of
youth crime, truancy and drop-out, as well as in developing targets for interven-
tion, e.g., YOUTH DEV. & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ADMIN., supra note 87, crimi-
nal justice libertarians remain fixated on the issue of net-widening, while
interventionists continue to call for increased funding for front-end programs,
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debate between justice libertarians and interventionists remains
focused on whether to expand or restrict formal criminal justice
and social service intervention, neither perspective gives ade-
quate attention to the role and potential influence of informal
social control nor its place in a coherent youth policy and a
responsive criminal justice agenda informed by broader theoreti-
cal perspectives and empirical research on communities and
crime."' Such an agenda would be sensitive to the relationship
between criminal justice and communities in the context of both
the harm of crime and the harm of intervention. 157 It would also
be grounded in research on the resiliency of offenders, victims,
and communities that documents the presence and value of pro-
social commitments and positive relationships even in the most
high-risk environments. 158 Ultimately, both interventionist and
libertarian lenses promote simplistic views that ignore the com-
munity as a stakeholder capable of playing a fundamental role in
the response to youth crime.
2. Informal Controls, Micro-Communities, and the Lens of
Restorative Justice
a. Diminishing Informal Control
From an historical perspective, truancy policy, like many
other responses to youth trouble and crime, may be viewed as a
case study in how efforts to centralize, professionalize, and
expand juvenile justice, social services, and even prevention not
only widen system nets, but also arguably weaken community
nets,159 ultimately leaving communities helpless and hapless.1 60
In the truancy intervention example presented here, an unin-
tended consequence of such an initiative may be that local
schools and other community partners begin to feel less respon-
sibility and capability to play their intended, traditional roles in
the response to unexcused absences and other school problems.
e.g., Arnold Binder & Gilbert Geis, Ad Populum Argumentation in Criminology:
Juvenile Diversion as Rhetoric, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 309 (1984).
156. See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION
(1989); BURSIK & GRASMICK, supra note 31; Sampson et al., supra note 31.
157. Rose & Clear, supra note 32.
158. See generally PETER BENSON, ALL KIDS ARE OUR KIDS (1997); Lisa
Maher, Punishment and Welfare: Crack Cocaine and the Regulation of Mothering, in
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF A WOMAN'S BODY 157 (Cynthia Feinman ed., 1992);
Michael Rutter, Resilience in the Face of Adversity: Protective Factors and Resistance to
Psychiatric Disorder, 147 BRIT. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 598 (1985).
159. Braithwaite, Thinking Harder, supra note 28, at 219.
160. See JOHN McKNIGHT, THE CARELESS SOCIETY- COMMUNITY AND ITS
COUNTERFEITS (1995).
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Although sheriffs deputies understood the need to "fill the
gap," many also expressed concerns about what may be viewed as
the irony of the "success" of the truancy reduction initiative (at
least in terms of removing truants from the streets)-i.e., a
decline in the willingness of schools and families to assume more
than minimal responsibility for school attendance. Unfortu-
nately, assumption of these tasks and roles in the response to
youthful misconduct by a criminal justice agency in a highly visi-
ble and comprehensive initiative may send an inadvertent mes-
sage to schools, families, and neighborhood groups to leave such
problems "to the experts." Having sent this message, it will ulti-
mately seem confusing, if not irresponsible, to then ask for more
community support and collaboration. Indeed, officers fre-
quently complained about the lack of accountability on the part
of schools, families, and neighborhoods as the real source of the
truancy problem. The true irony of the Southeastern County
case study could, therefore, be that an initiative which many
officers felt should be aimed at least partially at mobilizing and
energizing parents, schools, and neighborhood support groups
to assume more responsibility seemed instead to further reduce
the authority and commitment of these groups.
This phenomenon is neither the fault of the sheriff's office,
nor is it unique to schools and law enforcement policy. The
larger context for the truancy reduction policy is that the role
and mandate of the school as a public, community-based institu-
tion with irreplaceable socialization responsibilities has become
increasingly restricted in the wake of zero tolerance and the
increase in criminal and juvenile justice involvement. Moreover,
as criminal justice agencies have taken on increasing responsibil-
ity for tasks once dealt with by citizens at the neighborhood level
by less formal means, some have argued that communities are
losing their capacity to respond to many of the problems that
now find their way into arrest files. Indeed, efforts to centralize
and expand the reach of criminal justice and social services may
have diminished both the skills and initiative of citizens, institu-
tions, and community groups in responding to crime and disor-
der because, as Clear and Karp observe:
When agents of the state become the key problem solvers,
they might be filling a void in community; but just as in
interpersonal relationships, so in community functioning,
once a function is being performed by one party, it
becomes unnecessary for another to take it on . . ..
[P]arents expect police or schools to control their chil-
dren; neighbors expect police to prevent late night noise
from people on their street; and citizens expect the courts
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to resolve disputes . . . . [I]nformal control systems may
(therefore) atrophy like dormant muscles. 161
In recent years, there has been an apparent decline in the
number and strength of "village" level private and parochial forms
of social control'6 2 that allowed neighborhood adults to infor-
mally sanction and provide guidance and support to young peo-
ple. While this decline represents a net loss in the "social capital"
required for the maintenance of safe communities, 163 such con-
siderations are not arguments in support of either less govern-
ment or of efforts to off-load criminal justice functions on
communities. 164 Any critique of the expansion of the criminal
justice role presented here is therefore not intended as a recom-
mendation to abandon criminal justice responsibility in response
to truancy. Rather, our argument is for a reconsideration and re-
visioning of the role ofjuvenile and criminal justice agencies vis-
d-vis the need for micro communities such as schools and paro-
chial institutions to assume, or reassume, these functions.
b. Restorative Justice and School Capacity Building
What, then, can be done to develop an alternative response to
the very real problems in socialization, social control, and human
and social capital of which high rates of truancy are sympto-
matic? An implicit theme throughout this Article has been the
neglect of the role of the school as a socializing and social con-
trol agent. However, if the school can be conceptualized as a
kind of micro-community with its own social ecology and struc-
tures of both formal and informal control, an alternative policy
lens may be of assistance in focusing attention on issues of the
school "community" as part of both the problem and the solu-
tion to truancy and school crime. One such alternate perspective
is provided by the emerging restorative justice framework. 16 5
As a harm-focused model of justice that defines crime
around damage to individuals, relationships, and community
161. CLEAR & KARP, supra note 23, at 38.
162. Hunter, supra note 19, at 238-39.
163. See generally Sampson et al., supra note 31; ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING
ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000); Bazemore,
Young People, supra note 28.
164. See generally ADAM CRAWFORD, THE LOCAL GOVERNANCE OF CRIME:
APPEALS TO COMMUNITY AND PARTNERSHIPS (1997).
165. E.g., BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION, supra note 9; MARA
SCHIFF & GORDON BAZEMORE, UNDERSTANDING RESTORATIVE CONFERENCING: A
CASE STUDY IN INFORMAL DECISIONMAKING IN THE RESPONSE TO YOUTH CRIME
(2003) (final report submitted to the National Institute of Justice, NIJ Grant
1999-IJ-CK-0060).
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configurations,166 the normative theory of restorative justice is
best defined by three core principles. 16 7 These principles gauge
the success of any intervention response to crime by the extent to
which harm is repaired (Principle 1), key stakeholders are
actively engaged in decision-making about such repair (Principle
2), and relevant affected communities increase their capacity to
respond to crime and conflict, with formal criminal justice sys-
tems in a supporting rather than directive role (Principle 3).
When crime, harm, trouble, and conflict are understood as col-
lective problems of weak relationships within communities, made
weaker still when new crimes occur or conflict is not addressed,
such reparative or healing processes and outcomes seem to offer
a broader framework that could replace punishment and treat-
ment as the primary currencies of criminal justice
intervention."'6
While they share with criminal justice libertarians a general con-
cern about the potential harm of criminal justice intervention,
and with interventionists a concern that ignoring problems of
social control invites more repressive formal responses, propo-
nents of restorative justice express strong preference for informal
resolutions that mobilize community controls and support.'
69
Such resolutions result from deliberations that occur in
nonadversarial decisionmaking practices generically described as
"restorative conferencing,"' 70 which seek to maximize involve-
ment and input of victims, offenders, and community members
in the response to the harm of crime and conflict. Restorative
conferences, which typically result in agreements for offending
166. ZEHR, supra note 9, at 181.
167. VAN NESS & STRONG, supra note 27, at 37.
168. See Bazemore, Young People, supra note 28. Restorative community
justice stands in sharp contrast to other "harm focused" criminal justice models
that emphasize law and order, or zero-tolerance policing. The latter models
arguably seek to redefine offensive behaviors such as public drunkenness,
vagrancy, and youthful status offenses as harmful, and thereby as offenses justify-
ing legal intervention. See RESTORATIVE COMMUNITY JUSTICE: REPAIRING HARM
AND TRANSFORMING COMMUNITIES (Gordon Bazemore & Mara Schiff eds., 2001)
[hereinafter RESTORATIVE COMMUNITY JUSTICE]. In contrast, restorative justice
proponents seek to minimize formal intervention and maximize informal com-
munity resolution and, therefore, would not seek to define harmful behaviors
as crimes. Contra Bratton, supra note 121.
169. See, e.g., John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and
Pessimistic Accounts, in 25 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH (Michael
Tonry ed., 1999); Bazemore, Young People, supra note 28; Christie, supra note 33.
170. E.g., BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION, supra note 9; Gordon
Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, A Comparison of Four Restorative Conferencing Models,
Juv. JUST. BULL. (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency
Prevention, Wash. D.C.), Feb. 2001, at 1.
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parties to repair the harm and/or work to resolve ongoing con-
flict, can provide an alternative to traditional disciplinary
responses in the school setting. 7 ' Use of conferencing in
schools has recently demonstrated positive results in reducing
suspensions, disciplinary responses (such as referrals to the prin-
cipal's office), and school violence. 172 Hence, to the extent that
these and other restorative processes might be employed as prob-
lem-solving responses to truancy, they may increase attachment
of truant students to school, while also developing a school cul-
ture and climate more capable of mobilizing and building inter-
nal networks of informal control and support. 173
3. Understanding and Confronting the New Expansionism
Beyond Black's theory that the expansion of formal law is a
function of the decline in community informal social control,1 74
we have suggested that changes in the extent and nature of crim-
inal justice expansion may actively weaken informal controls as
part of a reciprocal impact. That is, as Rose and Clear argue,"state controls, which typically are directed at individual behav-
ior, have important secondary effects on family and neighbor-
hood structure [that] impede the neighborhood's capacity for
informal control [and thereby] exacerbate the very problems
that lead to crime in the first place. '175 For the most part, how-
ever, analysts have focused attention almost exclusively on the
effect of more apparent harms of large scale formal interventions
such as the incarceration of young black men in urban communi-
171. See generally David Karp & Beau Breslin, Restorative Justice in School
Communities, 33 YOUTH AND Soc. 249 (2001); RIESTENBERG, IN-SCHOOL BEHAV-
IOR, supra note 22.
172. See generally BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION, supra note 9;
RIESTENBERG, IN-SCHOOL BEHAVIOR, supra note 22.
173. See ART PEARL & TONY KNIGHT, THE DEMOCRATIC CLASSROOM
(2000); Bazemore, supra note 28. As suggested in the best practices and litera-
ture review, such intervention practices would include a number of "whole-
school" interventions aimed at school retention. Notably, recent alternatives to
suspension and traditional disciplinary actions in K-12 schools, such as family
group conferencing and other restorative justice decision-making processes,
may for a number of reasons also exert positive impact on school retention, and
theoretically impact overall school climate. Other positive youth development
strategies and youth involvement efforts to engage students in a variety of deci-
sion-making processes in school to promote effective citizenship and a sense of
"ownership" of the school as community have also been shown to be effective.
PEARL & KNIGHT, Supra. See also RIESTENBERG, IN-SCHOOL BEHAVIOR, supra note
22.
174. BLACK, supra note 18, at 68.
175. Rose & Clear, supra note 32, at 441.
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ties,176 or have expressed concerns about the harmful impact of
the aggressive, zero-tolerance responses to low level crime and
disorder.17 7 Because of generally benevolent motives associated
with new social service collaboratives and the expressed intent to
assist youth at risk, partnerships such as the Southeastern County
truancy initiative have generally not been the target of critical
analysis.
As important as empirical evaluation findings may be in
challenging this approach to truancy intervention,1 78 there are
even greater implications for broader policy development in the
response to school based trouble and crime. Most critically, the
Southeastern County experience as a case study in youth policy
and criminal justice policy analysis should be understood in the
wider context of expansionism and the transformation of bound-
aries between formal and informal social control. Theoretically,
if neighborhood disorder control has an impact on crime only
when it is linked to the development of social capital and collec-
tive efficacy as some research suggests, 179 similarly, truancy inter-
vention may be effective in reducing youth crime only when it
builds school and broader community capacity to socialize and
integrate young people. Increasingly disconnected from pro-
social adults and a conventional future, many young people at
risk appear collectively to be part of an expanding international
cohort that can no longer be characterized as simply "marginal,"
but is perhaps best described as a generation of "abandoned
youth."' ° Left behind by economies that no longer provide for
entry level rungs in an employment ladder connected to work
careers, members of this group are thus more "free" to become
involved in troublesome behaviors, violation of truancy statutes,
and youth crime.
CONCLUSION
For the future, we suspect that perceived breakdowns in
social control within community institutions such as schools will
lead in many jurisdictions to responses similar to the one devel-
oped in Southeastern County. Indeed, given other potentially
more harmful alternatives on the current scene (e.g., secure
176. Id.
177. HARCOURT, supra note 59.
178. E.g., Bazemore, Stinchcomb, & Leip, supra note 108.
179. E.g., Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 138.
180. E.g., Kenneth Polk, Positive Youth Development, Restorative Justice, and
the Crisis of Abandoned Youth, in RESTORATIVE COMMUNITY JUSTICE: REPAIRING
HARM AND TRANSFORMING COMMUNITIES 265 (Gordon Bazemore & Mara Schiff
eds., 2001).
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detention for truants), the current response may well appear to
be among the least objectionable options. From this perspective,
it must, therefore, be acknowledged that the Southeastern
County sheriff took risks and exercised proactive leadership in
taking on the task of mobilizing other agencies to address an
important community problem.
Criminal justice officials-whether in law enforcement, pros-
ecution, or the judiciary-may be expected to adopt politically
popular "managerial" solutions to persistent problems of youth
socialization and social control. By forging new partnerships and
seeking to promote flexibility, such responses stretch the bound-
aries of formal social control agencies. However, there is noth-
ing inherently good or bad about "collaboration"-like
"community," another "magic word" with few negative connota-
tions, but often little concrete meaning. 8' The greatest danger
we see is when such system-driven collaborations are presented as
a kind of "community justice" response that in fact simply brings
about change in the location of intervention, rather than mobil-
izing neighborhood resources around problems such as truancy.
Like other components of juvenile justice expansion discussed
herein, such collaborations may erode more effective informal
controls and instead shore up a professional capacity to relieve
schools, neighborhoods, and extended family networks of
responsibility for dealing with troublesome, though non-crimi-
nal, young people.
Thus, there are good reasons for skepticism and a clear
need for critical perspectives on proposed new partnerships, as
well as on the range of "new justice" solutions such as specialty
courts and various efforts to improve flexibility and "customer
service." Similarly, despite its appeal as an alternative lens for
breaking out of policy boxes, the community emphasis of restora-
tive justice'82 is no panacea for resolving problems of the type
discussed in this Article. Hence, depending on the quality and
context of their implementation, restorative practices may even
add to the problems of expansionism if proponents of these
approaches accept without question the current role of police or
probation officers in many schools or fail to question vague calls
for partnerships that do not challenge dominant policy lenses.
Currently, restorative community conferencing programs in
some parts of the country appear to have simply fit into slots in
the expansionist agenda of juvenile justice systems, taking many
181. See STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL: CRIME, PUNISHMENT
AND CLASSIFICATION 2-4 (1985).
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case referrals of students suspended from schools for a wide
range of "offenses" and rule violations consistent with zero
tolerance.
While restorative justice advocates would accurately argue
that these programs almost always provide a better alternative
than current options-suspension or referral to courtl1 3 -they
may also contribute to the problem when their programs address
issues that should arguably have been engaged in and by the
school community itself. The opposite tendency can also be
seen, however, in cases where restorative programs and initiatives
have insisted upon working first with educational personnel and
students to develop such responses in the school itself.'" 4 The
goal of such work is to build the capacity of schools as communi-
ties to mobilize informal control and support and, thereby,
whenever possible avoid formal intervention that may harm indi-
vidual students, as well as school culture and climate.185
Arguably, the important causal factors in the problems of
youth socialization, troublesome behavior, and conflict for which
truancy is one symptom are more properly issues of social justice.
Indeed, a major underlying thesis of this Article is that such
issues are difficult to impact in any positive way through criminal
justice strategies." 6 Though not straightforward, there are, how-
ever, connections within the broader restorative movement that
may allow practitioners and community members to begin to
actualize Christie's notion of crime as an opportunity for social
transformation.' 87 Proponents of these new visions also recog-
nize the limits of an individually-focused, case-driven, profession-
183. E.g., BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION, supra note 9; Sherman,
supra note 6.
184. MINN. DEP'T OF CHILDREN, FAMILIES, & LEARNING, supra note 22.
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alized response unconnected to efficacious communities.
Because of this, they are becoming involved in intentional efforts
to rebuild now-weakened informal networks of community social
control and support for young people through restorative justice
processes. Indeed, restorative practices might become a catalyst
for a "democratization of social control" whereby a kind of "bub-
bling up" becomes possible as social justice issues are increasingly
aired in restorative community justice forums. 18  One practi-
tioner, who has noted that restorative processes naturalistically
engage social justice by breaking down social distance, suggests
simply that
the problem of crime is generating opportunities to under-
stand and practice democracy in the community in [new]
ways.... [C]reating safe communities requires active citi-
zen involvement. Such involvement means re-engaging all
citizens in the process of determining shared norms, hold-
ing one another accountable to those norms, and deter-
mining how best to resolve breaches in a way that does not
increase risk in the community.
189
In any case, even describing the parameters of the new
expansionism and considering alternative policy responses to
social problems is very challenging without an alternative vision,
however utopian such a vision might be. It is also extremely diffi-
cult to break away from ingrained, but limited policy choices dic-
tated by currently dominant policy lenses. For a more optimistic
perspective, we may turn for guidance to one of the most seem-
ingly pessimistic critics of community-focused solutions to com-
plex problems, Stanley Cohen, who has stated his "preference is
to be pragmatic about short-term possibilities, but to be genu-
inely utopian about constructing long-term alternatives." 0
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